

COUNTERINSURGENCY: ONE APPROACH TO DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
J.F.C. KENNEY, JR., Major, Infantry

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1964

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

Assume that there are four approaches to the formulation of military doctrine, each applying itself to a different level of activity. These four approaches are philosophical, conceptual, structural, and applicatory. The philosophical approach to the formulation of doctrine provides general rules for the conduct of operations by assisting the commander with a generalized mission analysis leading to a visualization of the operation or the progress of an entire campaign. The conceptual approach is that which translates major tasks into terms of phases, objectives, force structure and development, and the means of controlling and supervising the conduct of the campaign. More specific than either the philosophical or conceptual approaches is the structural approach. This approach assumes tasks and concepts and then provides for the force structure and its employment in each phase of the campaign. This approach concentrates on the combat factors: firepower, mobility, and communications; and the support factors: logistics, psychological operations, and civil affairs operations as they apply to the conduct of a campaign. The applicatory approach addresses itself to the testing of derived doctrine or the formulation of doctrine from empirical knowledge. This paper presents a philosophical approach to a doctrine for counterinsurgency. More specifically it defines the environment and analyzes the mission of a senior commander of United States military forces, or a senior officer advising the military forces of another nation, engaged in directing military operations during a counterinsurgency campaign.

It is extremely important for the senior military commander to be

fully aware of the political nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency because the ultimate solution to insurgency must be found in political action. Since an insurgency can flourish only in an atmosphere of discontent, those who seek lasting success in countering the insurgency must work to remove or reduce discontent by honest political action. Political integrity is the sine qua non of counterinsurgency.

Before one can understand counterinsurgency, he must have a comprehension of the nature of insurgency. This paper examines insurgency in terms of its goal, its levels, and the intensity of activity associated with each of its levels. Establishing at the outset that the goal of insurgency is the overthrow and replacement of established authority, the paper divides insurgency into five levels and then describes the characteristic activities identified with each level. The five levels of insurgency are:

1. Clandestine organization.
2. Psychological offensive.
3. Organized guerrilla warfare.
4. War of movement.
5. External aggression.

For each level of insurgency there is an appropriate level of counteraction. For example, police intelligence work combined with a form of population control is an appropriate activity to counter clandestine organization. External aggression must be countered by a full commitment of conventional forces. Combinations of techniques drawn from between these extremes provide the proper level of counterinsurgency to meet the various insurgent threats.

If an insurgency threatens, or appears to threaten, the national interest of the United States, in all likelihood there will be some degree of military involvement on the part of this country. Since the application of large forces is an inappropriate reaction to the lowest levels of insurgent activity, the involvement of U.S. military forces in either an

advisory or a combat role would be unlikely at a level of insurgency lower than organized guerrilla warfare. There is in existence a large body of doctrine to guide a senior commander in the conduct of the conventional military operations best suited to counter a war of movement or external aggression. Therefore, this paper concentrates on formulating a doctrine for countering an insurgency characterized by organized guerrilla warfare.

The mission of the senior commander in such a situation is expressed as three interrelated tasks:

1. He must defeat the insurgent forces.
2. Within the limits of his capability and authority he must eliminate the conditions which caused the insurgency.
3. He must develop and maintain the capability to prevent the recurrence of the insurgency as a military threat from within the nation and from an external source.

The defeat of the insurgent force, the guerrilla, is predicated on the denial of the prerequisites for a guerrilla movement. These prerequisites are:

1. Support from the people.
2. A secure base.
3. Initiative in tactical operations.

The first action toward the defeat of the guerrilla is the denial of his access to the people. For such a denial to be effective, the separation must be accomplished on both the physical and ideological planes.

The physical separation of the guerrilla from its popular support requires two actions. First, a force strong enough to defeat or drive off the guerrilla force must seize the area of operations. Second, that force must remain in the area to prevent the return of the guerrilla so that the physical separation of the people and the guerrilla can com-

plement the ideological separation of the two. Since ideological separation is dependent on the ability of the government to remove the causes of the insurgency, it is discussed in the portion of the paper which deals with that part of the commander's mission.

A second task necessary to defeat the guerrilla is the denial of a secure base. Like the denial of the guerrilla's physical access to the population, the denial of his secure base depends on area control. In his determination of the priorities for areas to be cleared the counterinsurgent commander must take into account what the guerrilla considers favorable terrain. Ideally, the guerrilla base would be located in relatively impenetrable terrain which would still afford him close contact with the people. Of course great benefits accrue to the guerrilla if the base is also located to provide extraterritorial sanctuary.

The denial of a secure base is a matter of occupation, destruction, interdiction, or a combination of the three. However, the denial of the external base, or sanctuary, does not lend itself to occupation or destruction; therefore, its denial must be interdiction. Such interdiction can be accomplished by a number of means ranging from trail ambushes to the physical sealing of a nation's borders and the closing of its seacoast. While engaged in the denial of the physical base for insurgency, the counterinsurgent commander must keep in mind that he must deny also the guerrilla's moral base in the population. Like ideological separation of the guerrilla and the people, this action is discussed in terms of removing the cause of insurgency.

Denying the guerrilla the initiative must also be accomplished on two planes: the political and the military. Although the military counterinsurgent commander may not be authorized to speak and act freely

in the political field, he must be fully aware of the importance of gaining the initiative in this field; and he must take every action within his authority and capability to see that it is gained and retained. The counterinsurgent commander can gain the military initiative by constant offensive activity. The essence of this activity is best described as a forcing game in which the counterinsurgent forces maintain a steady pressure on the guerrilla allowing him no rest, no time to plan or to refit.

Once the actions of the counterinsurgent military force have achieved a physical separation of the people and the guerrilla in an area of operations, the counterinsurgent commander must act to remove the cause of insurgency in the area and to restore the authority of the established government. In order to do this the commander must be fully aware of the nature and cause of the insurgency and the quality of the insurgent leadership in the area. In determining the strength of the cause, the factors he must consider are the bases of discontent which gave rise to the cause. This paper categorizes the nature of discontent according to political, social, or psychological conditions. Having determined the form of discontent peculiar to the area of operations the counterinsurgent commander must assess the pattern of insurgent leadership and determine its contribution to the strength of the insurgent movement in the area. Allied with a determination of the pattern of leadership is the system of insurgent population control. Although ideally the people would be motivated by the insurgent's persuasion, practically an insurgency controls its population by a combination of persuasion and threat. The counterinsurgent commander can use the degree of intimidation the insurgent found necessary as an indicator of the relative strength of the cause in the area of operations. A third means of assessing the strength of the insurgency is to determine the degree to which the various segments of the pop-

ulation are committed to the insurgent cause.

Having determined the strength of the insurgent cause in terms of political, social, and psychological conditions, the quality of insurgent leadership, and the commitment of the population, the counterinsurgent commander must accomplish three tasks necessary to winning the support of the people. They are:

1. To continue the separation of the people and the insurgent.
2. To establish effective leadership and administration.
3. To guarantee protection to the leaders and the people.

The physical separation of the people and the guerrilla is continued by various means of population control which complement the physical separation already achieved by the presence of a strong military force. This control may range in severity from roadblocks and curfews to the use of sealed villages. Ideological separation has as its goal the removal of personal support of the insurgent movement. This is best achieved by improving the in-group loyalty of the population; a system of rewards and punishments authorized by the established order and administered by the local population; personal commitment; and the use, as a government propaganda weapon, of any overt act of the ousted insurgent should he attempt to regain power.

The departure of the insurgent force and the driving underground of its leadership creates a political vacuum the counterinsurgent commander must act to fill with honest administration and effective leadership. If it is at all possible the counterinsurgent commander must attempt to draw on the resources of the local population to fulfill these needs. Of the two means of finding the leaders and administrators, selection and local election, local election is by far the more desirable solution even though it carries a greater short-term risk.

The final task of removing the cause of insurgency is allied with preventing its recurrence. That task is the protection of the leaders and the new political system against insurgent attack. Once the counterinsurgent commander has re-established the position of governmental authority and gained the support of the people in an area, he must train the self-defense forces and the police forces of the area in those techniques which will prevent the return of insurgent influence. And once the counterinsurgent commander is satisfied that the people of a locality are capable of their own counterinsurgent defense, the regular military force can be withdrawn to begin operations in a new area. At that time the responsibility for the internal security of the area passes to those on whom it had depended all along - the people.

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FOREWORD

The rain had been falling steadily all afternoon. The main canal and the tributary streams and canals were swollen and their banks were treacherously slick. Even though it was summer in the Delta country, canal and stream crossing had become a cold and quite uncomfortable experience. Therefore the battalion commander and I had chosen to risk the slight possibility of ambush to travel down the main canal by sampan. Actually the danger of ambush was extremely remote because our soldiers were scrambling abreast of us along the canal banks. So far the operation had been routine: a helicopter-borne assault on a suspected guerrilla hideout; the discovery of a few sewing machines, some flags, and a few propaganda leaflets; and now the long walk out of the seemingly endless rice fields and through the traces of jungle which had successfully resisted the rice farmers' advance. The size of the canal told us that we were approaching the district capital and that it might be only three or four hours more until we would be inside its barbed wire fence. Soon we would be dining with the district chief while the unit prepared for our return to Soc Trang to stage for the next phase of the operation.

The reverie was shattered by the rattle of gunfire about one hundred meters ahead on the left bank. Three shots, perhaps four, fired from a single automatic weapon, the jabber of excited voices, and then silence - silence enforced by the six-feet tall reeds that line the canal bank. The reeds parted suddenly just beside us, and there

appeared the battalion surgeon, accompanied by two soldiers carrying a litter. With them was another aid man holding a bottle of plasma above the black-clad form on the litter. With a shrug the battalion commander surrendered our sampan to the cause of mercy, and we scrambled up the bank. When I last saw our sampan, it was carrying the surgeon, the aid man with the plasma bottle, the wounded man, and a pale, grief-stricken woman. She was already dressed in black; she was barefoot, and around her head was a black-and-white checkered scarf twisted to form a sort of turban. She never took her eyes off the bottle of plasma.

As we walked the rain slackened; and as we approached the outer defenses of the district village, the first rays of a persistent late afternoon sun began to light up the last few raindrops and paint the village with great splotches of yellow gold. The district chief, an army captain, met us at the village gate. He was delighted to have regular troops in the village, and, anxious for military gossip, invited us to dinner.

The dinner was served in a dark room lighted only by the rays of the setting sun and a small candle burning in front of an image of Buddha. Of the battalion officers, the last to arrive for dinner was the surgeon. He furnished us with the details concerning the death of the man who had been shot earlier in the afternoon.

The medical report would show that the deceased had expired in mid-afternoon as a result of three bullet wounds received while attempting to run from a flank squad of Fourteenth Company, First Battalion, Airborne Brigade. The report of the surgeon's conversation with the woman in the sampan was much more revealing.

The woman was the wife of the wounded man; and while she squatted against the gunwales of the sampan, her eyes still fixed on the

plasma bottle as if, perhaps, it contained some miracle she could beg for her husband, she told of the incidents which led to his death on a rainy afternoon.

He was shot as a suspected guerrilla because he ran instead of surrendering to the soldiers whose job it was to round up all adult males for identification and interrogation, and to shoot all those who ran to avoid capture. Whether he was truly a guerrilla, only he knew for sure; but his wife denied that he had ever been. For he was a farmer and nothing more. Then why did he run? He ran because he was forced by circumstance to choose among evils.

A few days before our arrival in the district, the real guerrillas came to her husband and many like him to inform them that soon large government forces would be operating in Vi Thanh district. Therefore, the guerrillas and those who sympathized with them would depart the district until the government soldiers had gone. Of course a few snipers would remain behind to harass the government troops and to give them a real enemy to pursue, but something had to be done to convince the government that the guerrilla population in the district was still high. The solution was simple. The guerrilla leaders simply informed all the adult males who remained on their land to run as the soldiers approached. Since the government forces would not remain long in the district, and since the guerrilla underground informers would still be active in the villages, the guerrillas would return as soon as the soldiers had gone. At that time they would "execute" all those who had not run from the soldiers. The woman's husband, faced with such alternatives, put his faith in poor marksmanship and died.

The battalion executive officer, a volatile young man, recognized the theme of her story as did all the others sitting at the district

chief's table. But since this was my first encounter with this sort of incident, he felt compelled to illustrate the frustration he and his companions felt and to explain to me how this situation had come to be.

Without warning he thrust his forefinger into the bowl of soup which had been placed before him and exclaimed, "We are like my finger. When it pushes into the bowl, the soup parts to let it in. When it comes out of the bowl, the soup closes over and no one could ever know I had had my finger in the soup. Why do we come here on these operations if we fail to meet the enemy and bring harm only to those we are trying to help? You see, this is a bad war."

To comment that there is no good war would be facetious. Yet, war with all its terrors, frustrations, and waste is a product of human frailty. The war which gave rise to this incident is a small war and yet a large war. It is the most limited of wars, conducted in small paddies and on remote trails by small numbers of combatants rarely in contact. Yet it is part of a huge war, one which might settle the political fate of the peoples of the world. To conceive, singly, a strategy for the huge war is impossible; to describe the low level military tactics and techniques to employ in the small wars would be redundant.

It is the purpose of this paper to formulate a doctrine for military operations which will begin to answer the battalion executive officer's question and eventually to establish conditions in counter-guerrilla warfare which might preclude needless killing of terrified innocents. To the Viet-Nameese people, my teachers in the realities of little wars, this paper is humbly dedicated.

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INTRODUCTION

The common image which we draw up by thinking of military operations is one which combines fluttering flags, glittering legions, the awesome holocaust of nuclear destruction, or the other glimpses of glory and horror which we normally associate with military activity. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the picture is not complete. For example, excluded from the common image is the mammoth complex of supplies, ships, technical personnel, and hospitals, to list a few, which are necessary to the logistical support of military operations. Also excluded are the operations so vital in countering insurgent movements: in particular intelligence activities, psychological warfare and propaganda, troop information programs, and all the activities which make up military-civic action. The absence of these factors from the common image takes on significance under two conditions: the worse, that military leaders and planners might choose to ignore, or pay lip service only to, those factors which do not make up the image; the other, that the civilian population might withhold its support from the military forces except under conditions easily recognized as war.

The oft-voiced charge that the military plans to fight each war with the weapons and tactics of the last war stems from a manifestation of the tendency to focus attention only on the obvious idea of war. It is easier to teach and to plan within an accepted image than to step beyond the image to teach and plan in uncomfortably undefined subject areas. Often only the genesis of concepts like counterinsurgency, and unmistakably strong emphasis on a high level can bring about a

desire to go beyond conventional ideas. The professional soldier can never afford to ignore the common factors of war; neither can he afford to deny the importance of those factors like propaganda, or police work, or the other unglamorous but necessary tasks which can lead to victory or defeat in a situation short of war.

Because the threat of mutual nuclear destruction will hang, possibly for generations, above the heads of both camps of the present world, the professional soldier must not overlook the threat of what Trinquier calls "modern warfare."¹ For it is the function of the professional soldier to prepare to guide the military destiny of the country in war, regardless of what sort of war he finds himself in.

In the succeeding chapters I shall develop a doctrine for senior commanders engaged in military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign. It will be a doctrine to provide guidance for a Chief, MAAG, or military mission, or a unified, combined, or task force commander who is faced with the problem of countering an insurgent movement or of advising the political and military leaders of a friendly nation in their attempts to combat insurgency.

Counterinsurgency is a romantic new word in a world which is inclined to accept new terms as new disciplines. Actually it is an old idea. Counterinsurgency is also counter-rebellion, counter-insurrection, and counter-revolution. In the long run it is a counteraction to the threat or activity associated with an insurgent effort. Now we come to the real source of the problem. If we are to have counterinsurgency, we must, then, be aware of what insurgency is constituted. For the sake of

¹Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

clarity in this paper, insurgency is any activity which has as its end the extralegal removal of an incumbent regime from its governmental function and the substitution of another regime for that which has been toppled. Insurgency, therefore, can include any activity from the initial organization of a covert effort to subvert a government in being to the attempted subjugation of a nation by a foreign army. The spread of insurgency is wide, and the nature of the plans and actions which make up counterinsurgency must be equally wide and varied. Counterinsurgency, then, is that combination of activities which has as its goal the defeat or the precluding of success of an insurgent movement.

This paper is written on three major themes. The first of these is the discussion of the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and it closes with an estimate of probable United States military involvement in counterinsurgency. The first chapter emphasizes the influence of politics and political action on military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign. The second and third chapters deal with the nature of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and U.S. involvement.

The second theme is the formulation of the doctrine in terms of the counterinsurgent commander's mission and the analysis of tasks to be accomplished. There are three chapters in this portion of the paper. Each deals with the analysis of one of the major tasks facing the counterinsurgent commander. The final theme is contained in the last chapter. In that chapter I will point out how the detailed formulation of counterinsurgency doctrine by conceptual, structural, and applicatory approaches can be accomplished; and I will show the need for further study in fields related to counterinsurgency.

There are four approaches to the formulation of doctrine, each applying itself to a different level of activity. These four approaches

are philosophical, conceptual, structural, and applicatory. The philosophical approach to formulation of doctrine provides the general rules for the conduct of operations by assisting the commander with a generalized mission analysis leading to a form of visualization of the operation or of the progress of the entire campaign. This approach to formulation of doctrine requires an understanding of the situation in which the campaign will be conducted, an understanding of the nature of the enemy force, and an understanding of the tasks which must be accomplished in the fulfillment of the commander's mission.

The conceptual approach to the formulation of doctrine is the approach whereby the general case doctrine derived by the philosophical approach is converted into concepts for operations to fit more specific situations. Another point of view of the conceptual approach would make it the translation of major tasks into terms of phases, objectives, force structure and development, and the means of controlling and supervising the conduct of the campaign.

More specific than the conceptual approach to doctrine is the structural approach. This approach assumes the tasks derived during the philosophical development of doctrine and then provides for the force structure and employment by phase consistent with an assumed concept of the operation. In this approach the doctrine concentrates on the combat factors: firepower, mobility, and communications; and the support factors: logistics, psychological operations, and civil affairs operations as they apply to the conduct of the campaign.

The final doctrinal approach, the applicatory approach, addresses itself to either of two cases: the testing of a derived doctrine by war-gaming or by combat; or, the formulation of doctrine from empirical knowledge gained from experience.

Actually, no formulation of doctrine can be accomplished by using a single approach. However, regardless of the necessity to mix approaches during the writing of a doctrine, one approach will be emphasized over the others. In this paper I have chosen to follow the philosophical approach for three reasons:

1. It provides for definitions of terms in a field where detailed definitions are needed.
2. It provides the opportunity to formulate doctrine written for a level of command which might require a doctrine of broad application which, in turn, allows for equally broad interpretation to fit a specific situation.
3. It provides a starting point for further development of doctrine using the conceptual, structural, and applicatory approaches.

The doctrine which appears in this paper, then, is one which sets the situation and analyzes the mission for a senior commander of United States military forces, or a senior United States officer advising the military forces of another nation, engaged in directing military operations during a counterinsurgency campaign.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL INTEGRITY - THE SINE QUA NON OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

It is self-evident that superior force at any point will obtain local victory, but it will not guarantee success for an entire campaign. Therefore, any military operation which is to contribute to the success of a campaign must be consistent with the overall objectives of the campaign itself, and its plan must take into account all the elements of the nature of warfare to be conducted. Later in this paper we shall see that the planning and conduct of military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign must reflect consideration not only of the purely military aspects of the campaign, but also the moral, political, psychological, economic, and social factors as well.

Of these, politics and political action are of the greatest importance, and yet they are the least amenable to military control. It is not the purpose of this chapter to recommend that the counterinsurgency commander indulge in partisan politics; but it is the purpose of this chapter to bring to his awareness early in this paper the political nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency in order that any recommendation he might be able to make to political authority may be couched in realistic terms.

In this chapter I will discuss the political basis for counterinsurgency, and I will establish some criteria for political integrity the incumbent regime must adopt if it is to achieve lasting success in its counterinsurgency effort. Let us start our discussion of the

importance of politics and political action by looking at things from the insurgents' point of view.

Naturally it is not to be thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through the impulse given to them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first guerrilla center is not practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate. . . . Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.¹

These two paragraphs taken from the opening pages of Guevara's well known treatise on guerrilla warfare establish two conditions for discussion. One is that political and guerrilla warfare insurgency are inseparable; and the other is that there is a minimum standard of political integrity which will serve to insure an incumbent regime against insurgency.

Mao Tse Tung, whose successes serve as models for other contemporary insurgents (including Guevara), says of guerrilla war:

Without a political goal guerrilla warfare must fail as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people, and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.²

Here, in the writings of two whose success in the conduct of guerrilla warfare has wrought revolutionary change in two continents and whose works have become texts for insurgents and would-be insurgents, we find that the key ingredient for insurgency, and therefore, counterinsurgency is political savoir faire. Their common recognition

¹Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), pp. 15-16.

²S.B. Griffith (trans.), Mao Tse Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 43.

of the significance of political action in the revolutionary atmosphere makes clear the need for a treatment of political action and political attitudes as they affect military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign.

The seed of insurgency, the political condition that arises out of a desire to destroy an incumbent government, is sown in discontent. It becomes apparent, then, that the first order of business for establishing the proper political atmosphere for countering insurgency is to eliminate the dissatisfaction of the people. For it is possible that once the discontent which spawned the insurrection is removed, the recalcitrant guerrilla, denuded of his self-proclaimed "righteous" cause, will stand branded as a bandit both by the people he sought to lead and the government he sought to destroy. How then is this to be achieved?

The best means of determining how to remove or reduce dissatisfaction among the people is to become familiar with the sources of discontent. According to the draft manuscript of U.S. Army Field Manual 31-22, a study of the history of insurgency since the end of World War II shows that there are five primary causes of insurgency:

1. Desire for national independence.
2. Foreign Exploitation.
3. Actual or alleged oppression.
4. Corruption.
5. Desire for economic and social improvement.³

For the past twenty years nationalism and the people's desire for political and economic independence have led to the collapse of the European dominated colonial system established in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In Algeria a French military force

³ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-22, "U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov 63), pp. 8-15.

of 400,000 troops actually achieved a military suppression of a nationalist insurrection. But despite the military neutralization of the rebellion and the sealing of the Algerian borders, the French inability to negotiate to their political advantage or to maintain in Algeria so large a force for a longer, perhaps interminable, period won for the Algerians their political independence in 1962.⁴ The force of nationalism joined the desire for the elimination of foreign exploitation to provide the moral basis for the resistance movement in Indo-China and led to the destruction of the French empire in southeast Asia in 1954. Before World War II all of Indo-China was beset by low standards of living, a high illiteracy rate, and low health standards. The war brought little improvement for the people, but it weakened the French grip on the area and so suggested the possibility of national independence for the peoples of that French colony. In addition to the theme of independence, it was necessary for the insurgent leaders only to point up the vast disparity between the living conditions of the French and the native Indo-Chinese to fan the coals of discontent into the flames of rebellion. The French failure to recognize the wave of dissatisfaction and the desire for national independence cost them their Eastern empire.⁵ The Indonesian revolt against the Dutch between 1947 and 1949 and the revolt in Iran led by Premier Mossadegh are other examples of insurgencies which had as their theme the desire for greater political and economic independence.

The desire for the relief from actual or alleged oppression was

⁴Bernard B. Fall, Counterinsurgency: The French Experience (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 18 Jan 63), pp. 16-17.

⁵Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 83-88.

the basis for at least three insurgencies in the post World War II period. The initial success of the Huk rebellion in the Philippine Islands especially in 1951 and 1952 was due largely to the oppressive measures taken by land-owners against tenant farmers and their families. Disproportionate division of land and profits became the political and psychological weapons of the Huk leadership.⁶ Ironically, the second example of an insurgency which succeeded because of its allying itself with the desire of the people to rid themselves of an oppressive master appears to be an insurgency which will bring to the people greater oppression than they overthrew. Nevertheless the success of Castro's revolution against the Batista dictatorship was due directly to the oppression the Cuban people had experienced under Batista.⁷ One of the strongest themes which Mao Tse Tung employed in his civil war against Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist regime in China was that the Communist armies were struggling to free the Chinese people from oppression first by the Japanese and later by the Nationalists. Mao's insurgency succeeded and the Communist forces using both guerrilla and conventional tactics drove the Nationalists from the Asian mainland in 1949.⁸ In 1963, the downfall of the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam was caused largely by his association with alleged oppression of the Buddhist religion in that country.⁹

⁶Robert A. Smith, Philippine Freedom, 1946-1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 143.

⁷Merle Kling, "Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare," The Annals, 341 (May 62), pp. 45, 48.

⁸F.F. Liu, Military History of Modern China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 243-270.

⁹"Back of the Revolt in Viet-Nam," U.S. News and World Report, 55 (11 Nov 63), p. 41.

The elimination of corruption as a cause for insurgency is usually closely associated with the desire for relief from oppression. If the foundation for the charge of oppression is justified, it is probably because corruption paved the way. It is significant that the two best publicized insurgencies which had as their theme the elimination of corruption were those of the Huks in the Philippines and the Communist Chinese. And it is interesting to note that the political method for countering insurgency practiced by Ramon Magsaysay stressed land reforms and the elimination of corruption in government at all levels, and it succeeded.¹⁰

The area of discontent which seems potentially most dangerous for the future stems from the desire for social and economic improvement. It has often been the cause for the coups d'etat which have plagued the republics of South American countries. And as long as one man can feel or be made to feel that the only recourse by which he may gain social and economic freedom and a measure of equality is insurrection, the ferment of discontent may produce in him the heady wine of rebellion.

Of the five primary causes of insurgency, two, the desire for national independence, and the freedom from foreign exploitation, should disappear from the historical scene before long. Today there are only a few colonies left, and for the most part they appear to be approaching a state of autonomy. So, very little longer can the would-be insurgent point out a foreign bogey-man as the object of his insurrectionist wrath. From this point on, it seems the insurgent must find his discontent on native grounds.

¹⁰Carlos P. Romulo, The Magsaysay Story (New York: The John Day Company, 1956), pp. 126-134, 154-160.

To prevent or eliminate dissatisfaction, governments now threatened with insurgency must survey their condition and then develop a political morality which will eliminate corruption and oppression, and honestly seek economic and social improvement for their own people. Holliday and Dabezies, in their paper Irregular Warfare in a Nutshell, present this same idea in these words:

The degree that the people identify the authorities with their own aims, well-being, and interests will accurately reflect the degree of dissatisfaction [they feel]. When the unpopularity of the authorities has reached a certain magnitude, no amount of police and military force can eliminate the potential of revolt; it can only hide it from view. Under these conditions true progress against . . . insurgents can only be made with a [voluntary] change in the government.¹¹

The choice for political action lies with the incumbent. Military force can gain him time for change or for escape, but it cannot hold back the tide forever. In the words of Paret and Shy:

Lasting success [in countering insurgency] requires a viable political settlement, and even operational success over a period of time demands the proper political framework for effective military action.¹²

Political action, political morality, political integrity; these are the sine qua non of counterinsurgency. The factors which will win over the people are many, and they must all be considered in every counterinsurgency plan. But one factor must take precedence over all the others - political integrity is the soul of counterinsurgency. Ultimate victory in what James Eliot Cross calls "Conflict in the

¹¹Sam Holliday and Pierre Dabezies, Irregular Warfare in a Nutshell (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Mimeographed paper, 1962), p. 58.

¹²Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 72.

Shadows"¹³ will fall to the leader who best convinces the people that their interest is his interest and who acts in accordance with that standard. No military doctrine can save the incumbent government which is unwilling to practice that principle.

¹³James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), Title.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY

To be of any use, a doctrine must meet a set of parameters which establish the rules of the game in which the doctrine will be employed. In the field of counterinsurgency we find that the parameters must include all the spectrum of insurgency, and then they must reflect the appropriate degree of counterinsurgency to meet each level. This paper is being written to provide a concept for American senior commanders; therefore, its parameters for counterinsurgency must make allowance for United States involvement in counterinsurgency at home and also in the assistance of a friendly nation.

Although the spectrum of insurgency remains the same, there are an infinite number of ways of dividing it into phases or levels. United States Army doctrine, found in Field Manual 31-22, "U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces," separates insurgency into three phases: latent and incipient subversion, organized guerrilla warfare, and war of movement,¹ a term borrowed from Mao Tse Tung. Such a grouping of terms is sufficient for describing guerrilla warfare, especially as practiced by the followers of Mao Tse Tung, but it does not allow for a more complete consideration of the entire spectrum of insurgency. For example, the term "war of movement" implies the welding together of highly organized guerrilla bands to produce a guerrilla force capable of conducting

¹U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-22, "U.S. Counterinsurgency Forces" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov 63), p. 6.

conventional warfare. But it does not imply the level of insurgency equal to overt aggression on an international scale by wholly conventional forces, nor does it include the form of insurgency represented by a coup d'etat supported by an overwhelming external military force. Two actions of the Soviet Army in Europe provide us with examples of such insurgencies. The Red Army crushed the government established by the Hungarian people in 1956; the same Army, standing on the borders of Czechoslovakia in 1948 provided sufficient force to bring success to the Communist takeover of that government.² Although a coup d'etat can be included as incipient subversion or as a part of organized guerrilla warfare, the coup d'etat described here is of another sort. It is merely a subtle form of external aggression in which the threat of force serves for the use of force itself. In either case a powerful external army is the instrument of insurgency.

Following the lead of other writers in this field,³ I have used a five level division of insurgency, and related to each level of insurgency the degree to which the United States might become involved in countering it. Although there is always a possibility of insurgency anywhere, even in the United States, my assumptions disregard that possibility in order to arrive at a more realistic set of parameters for discussion. Therefore, this discussion of insurgency, the nature and levels of insurgency, and probable U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency

²Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia 1918-1948 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 217.

³J. Hogard, "Guerre Revolutionnaire et Pacification," Revue Militaire d'Information, No. 280 (Jan 57), p. 16.

William A. Lybrand, Support, People, Control, Influence (n.p.d.), p.55.

Edward E. Rice, Counter Guerrilla Operations (Fort Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army Special Warfare School, n.d.), pp. 3-4.

will consider insurgency as it threatens the national interest of the United States rather than the American Constitution or governmental administration. In this case, the terms for reference for insurgency and counterinsurgency will deal with an insurgent threat to a nation which the United States is committed to support.

The five levels of insurgency mentioned above are:

1. Clandestine Organizations.
2. Psychological Offensive.
3. Organized Guerrilla Warfare.
4. War of Movement.
5. External Aggression.

These levels are listed here in ascending order of violence and may be described on graphic form as follows:

SPECTRUM OF INSURGENCY

Intensity of Insurgency	Sedition ↔ Demonstration ↔ Terror ↔ Conventional War				
Levels of Insurgency	Clandestine Organization	Psychological Offensive	Guerrilla Warfare	War of Movement	External Aggression
Goal of Insurgency	Overthrow and Replacement of Established Authority				

Before continuing into a discussion of the nature and levels of insurgency I wish to make it clear that this division of insurgency into five levels is one of convenience to clarify this presentation of the subject. As shown in the chart above, the goal of an insurgency is the overthrow and replacement of established authority. This goal can be realized at any level of insurgency. Further, there is no cause for an insurgency to proceed from organization to overthrow by moving from level to level as they are described here. The coup d'etat which assas-

minated the government of Czechoslovakia is an example of insurgency leaping from the level of clandestine organization to external (passive) aggression with a nod to psychological offensive. The coups d'etat which have plagued the government of the Republic of (South) Viet-Nam during the past six months are examples of the ability of clandestine organization to realize the goal of insurgency by itself. Finally, although a shift in the degree of intensity of insurgent activity might herald the shift of a movement from one level to another, it does not terminate the activity which is the identifying characteristic of the earlier level. For example, the shift from the level of clandestine organization to psychological offensive comes about as result of intensifying the activity of the clandestine organization, not its termination.

Peter Paret and John W. Shy referred to guerrilla warfare as "the symptom and not the cause"⁴ of the difficulties of a nation faced with an insurgent threat. From this comment we may conclude that these two authors have touched on a fundamental truth which should guide any presentation on the nature of insurgency especially when it is characterized by guerrilla warfare. A discussion of the nature of insurgency which deals only with the various forms it might assume would fall far short of its goal. A better approach would be to examine the cause of insurgency and then to examine the leadership and organization which give an insurgency its form. Once these factors have been examined, the discussion of the levels of insurgency will assume its proper relationship within

⁴Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 72.

the presentation of the nature of insurgency as an entity.

The cause of insurgency is discontent. The basis for discontent may be real, or it may be contrived;⁵ but the discontent itself must be real before it is sufficient to arouse people to even the lowest level of insurgency. In Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) Mao Tse Tung wrote that "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people, and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained."⁶ Mao later quotes two earlier Chinese military philosophers, Chang Tso Hue and Kao Kang, who looked upon guerrilla warfare as the strategy of a people seeking "emancipation" and relief from "oppression."⁷ Mao's success in China and the subsequent success of his methods in Indo-China and Cuba certainly give credibility to establishing a political grouping among the causes of discontent. The political nature of insurgency is also reflected in the doctrine of the United States Army. Field Manual 31-15, "Operations Against Irregular Forces," cites political, social, or economic conditions as ideological bases for resistance and then goes on to state that dissatisfaction is usually centered around a desire for:

1. National Independence
2. Relief from actual or alleged oppression.
3. Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.
4. Economic or social improvement.
5. Elimination of corruption.
6. Religious expression.

⁵Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 15.

⁶Griffith (trans.), Mao Tse Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 43.

⁷Ibid., p. 55.

⁸U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-15, "Operations Against Irregular Forces" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 61), p. 5.

Still, the mere existence of a cause, or causes, is not sufficient to bring into being an insurgent movement. The Marxist philosopher may say that historical movements result from economic pressures. Others might find other abstract goads to insurgency; but in the long run, a rebellion comes into existence because some man becomes a rebel. The purpose for revolution comes from outside the man; but his courage, will, and determination come from within. Any man may have these qualities from birth; but a rebel will cultivate them, perhaps for years, before he finds himself ready for rebellion.⁹ But a rebel alone is nothing; an insurgency must have an organization, and with it the rebellion moves from passive dissatisfaction to the first level of insurgency: clandestine organization.

When using the word, organization, one must keep in mind that the word can take on two general meanings: one of function, as in "social organization"; the other of activity, as in the "organization of one's work," in which "organization" is synonymous with "organizing." During the next few paragraphs the word, organization, will take on both meanings as I describe both the structure and activity of clandestine organization, the lowest level of insurgency.

The base structure of any insurgency is its clandestine organization, the underground. Professor J.K. Zawodny calls the underground a "social organization" and assigns it seven structural elements:

1. Headquarters, where the locus of formal power is crystallized.
2. Intelligence.
3. Communication.
4. Propaganda.
5. Cadres in reserve and in training.

⁹Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 9.

6. Logistics.
7. Fighting arms -- guerrilla and sabotage units.¹⁰

As we can see, the structural organization listed here exists to serve the functional organization of the insurgent movement. The establishment of these structural elements serves to answer Mao Tse Tung's rhetorical questions:

1. How are guerrilla bands formed?
2. How are guerrilla bands organized?
3. How are guerrilla bands armed and supplied?¹¹
4. What elements constitute a guerrilla band?¹¹

Note also that the structural organization of the underground fits the requirements the organization must meet as the insurgency progresses.

The first task of organization is to assess the chances for survival, and then, consistent with that, to determine strategy, especially with respect to the limits of various activities as the insurgency progresses.¹² In making that determination, the insurgent leadership must consider four significant factors as they affect the strategic objectives of the underground movement. The four factors are: the present strength of the insurgent movement with respect to the number of persons involved, their motivations, weapons available to them, and sources of recruits and armament; the attitude of the indigenous people It is now axiomatic that no underground movement can grow in the midst of a population hostile to the insurgent philosophy, goals, or actions⁷; the strength of the enemy,

¹⁰J.K. Zawodny, "Guerrillas and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivation, Escalation," The Annals, 341 (May 62), p. 9.

¹¹Griffith (trans.), op. cit., p. 71.

¹²Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 23.

to include his ability to sustain a "protracted war";¹³ the terrain and climate, in particular as they affect the living conditions for guerrilla forces, the security of bases, and the control and communication of guerrilla forces as the insurgency grows.

Although logistical considerations will play an increasing role as the movement gains size and momentum, they remain academic problems until the activity and direction of the insurgency provide reasonable experience figures and assumptions. In any case, no guerrilla force can expect the thirty-seven pounds per man per day logistical support provided for the United States Army soldier in combat.¹⁴

An additional factor for consideration is that of external support. Of course, if the insurgent movement has been given or promised support from outside the country, this factor must be considered as part of the strength of the movement. If the movement begins without outside support, the organizers should attempt to find a source for such support and to gain it as soon as possible. However, until the support has been received or promised, it cannot be considered in assessing the chances for survival or as affecting the strategy of the insurgent organization.

The strategic objectives against which these factors must be considered are: (1) the enhancing of the solidarity of the insurgent groups; (2) the undermining of enemy strength; (3) the preparing for general uprising [or the shift to the next level of insurgency]; and the gaining control of territory for the future establishment of bases or "free zones."¹⁵

¹³Mao Tse Tung, Collected Works, Vol. II (New York: International Publishers, 1954), pp. 122-123.

¹⁴U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-10, "Staff Officers' Field Manual, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Part I", p. 324.

¹⁵Zawodny, op.cit., pp. 11-14.

Another task which faces the insurgent group during clandestine organization is the selection of a commander and the establishment of the structure of the movement. There are three structural groupings which can be used depending on whether the leadership of the movement is predominantly political, military, or a combination of the two. Regardless of the structure chosen, the selection of a commander and establishment of a structure accomplish three ends: provide the movement single direction with a unified command, provide intermediate hierarchies or intermediate levels of command, and by judicious selection resolve rivalries within the group.

Once the strategy and structure of the movement have been determined, the leaders must begin to accomplish the immediate tasks which face them. Professor Zawodny identifies some of these tasks as functions of the leaders: to provide motivation for violence; to determine the degree of centralization [and conversely the degree of freedom of initiative]; to determine operational areas, dividing them geographically, socially [urban or rural], or ethnically, and to establish disciplinary standards.¹⁶

Other tasks of immediate importance are the centralizing of the control of intelligence; laying the groundwork for civilian administration (to be discussed in detail in a section on "parallel hierarchies"); and establishing of base areas; and, finally, in recognition of the atrophying effect of inaction, the initiation of the first overt activities of insurgency.

It may be modest at first designed to create confidence; mine laying, sabotage, attacks on unguarded or poorly guarded targets, on enemy

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 10-11.

patrols, on small posts and convoys. Minor enemy forces in the area are mopped up, but engagements are as yet avoided.

The guerrilla movement is born.¹⁷

Since an insurgency cannot flourish without at least the passive support of the people, it must plan and execute operations designed to discredit the established authority in the eyes of the people, and to present the insurgency and its cause in the most favorable light. The objective of such operations is the mind of the people. Psychological offensive, the second level, is the first overt act of insurgency and the least violent. It is characterized by a number of actions. They tend to divide themselves into two categories, destructive actions and constructive actions. In writing this portion of the paper I shall draw freely on the organization and definitions found in Ximenes' essay, "La Guerre Revolutionnaire et Ses Donnees Fondamentales," and I shall use examples based on the French experience in Indo-China and Algeria found in Bernard B. Fall's The Two Viet-Nams, Roger Trinquier's Modern Warfare, and Jean Larteguy's two historical novels, The Centurions and The Praetorians.

The destructive techniques of the psychological offensive in insurgency are those designed to break up the "old" society: passive resistance, strikes, riots, terrorism against the influential supporters of established authority. In South Viet-Nam, four thousand low level officials were killed between May, 1960 and May, 1961; and in the spring of 1962 a survey conducted by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession revealed that approximately 250 teachers had been kidnapped and another thirty allegedly killed.¹⁸ Ximenes identifies

¹⁷Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 22-31.

¹⁸Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (London: Pall Mall Press, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 360.

this activity as "dislocation," or the disruption of order.¹⁹

A second form of destructive technique, closely associated with dislocation is intimidation. It ranges from student parades, mass meetings, terrorism, and sabotage to guerrilla warfare on a limited scale. Its more violent forms are designed to promote a feeling of insecurity in a group and thus to challenge the established order's ability to protect its citizens. Terrorism is employed not merely to get rid of a person but to gain a psychological edge on a community. For example, a banker or a tax collector is murdered to frighten all bankers or all tax collectors, not merely to eliminate one. In sabotage, crops might be burned, not to destroy the crops but to frighten the farmers. Guerrilla warfare, even on a small scale, not only harasses officials, police, and soldiers, but it promotes an overall feeling of insecurity.

As the government reels under the blows of dislocation and intimidation, it becomes highly susceptible to a third form of the psychological offensive: demoralization. Inevitably, as a government begins to react to an insurgent threat, some excesses will be committed in its name. An overanxious soldier fires into a crowd of schoolchildren; a police officer reacts to pressure and, in his zeal to discover the name of a terrorist, tortures a suspect or an alleged accomplice; a judge, in his haste to get a troublemaker out of circulation, abrogates the defendant's right to counsel or Habeas Corpus. All of these and others can become stones of doubt to be cast on the government's good faith and justice. An articulate group of the population, sympathetic to the insurgents' cause can speed it on its way by denying a government's successes and exaggerating its failures. This action is completed by the

¹⁹Ximenes, "La Guerre Revolutionnaire et Ses Donnees Fondamentales," Revue Militaire d'Information, No. 281 (Feb-Mar 57), pp. 11-12.

"intoxication of the neutrals. . . to keep them out of the battle until the moment in which their cause will be swallowed."²⁰

The final destructive technique is elimination: the means whereby the tough ones are removed from the scene; assassination, kidnapping, deportation or execution. At this time the neutrals are called on to make a choice. "For on arriving at this point the rebels have achieved, one by one, the aims of success."²¹

The constructive techniques of the psychological offensive complement their destructive companions. Once having recruited a selected group and formed a base of activists of all types (intellectuals, orators, propagandists, specialists in every milieu, volunteer workers, soldiers, and organizers) the movement attempts to penetrate all the various popular activities and organized groups. Communist penetration of various organizations is common knowledge.

Psychological impregnation is another constructive method. Using the technique fathered by Pavlov and employed in modern advertising, the insurgent movement invents its slogans and then by mere repetition makes them seem to come true. Jean Larteguy describes two successes of crowd manipulation by means of psychological impregnation. The first of these is set in Viet-Nam and deals with the actions of the can-bo (Viet Minh politico-psychological leaders) and their success at crowd manipulation during the prisoner march from Dien Bien Phu to Camp One²² and at the prisoner exchange at Hai-Phong.²³ In a later book, he relates the suc-

²⁰Ibid., p. 13.

²¹Ibid., pp. 14-15.

²²Jean Larteguy, The Centurions, trans. Xan Fielding (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 76.

²³Ibid., p. 191.

cess of the Viet-Minh educated French officers whose crowd manipulation on May 13, 1958, in Algiers brought down the Fourth Republic.²⁴ Adolf Hitler used the same technique in his climb to power in 1933.

Probably the most skillful technique employed in the psychological offensive is encadrement, or the establishment of "parallel hierarchies," which gives both structure and control to an insurgency. Rather than simple penetration of groups and organizations, the goal of encadrement is to establish an administrative structure which can assume control as soon as the established authority has been destroyed. According to Bernard B. Fall the establishment of parallel hierarchies is the most dangerous of the aspects of insurgency because it gives the insurgent movement the opportunity to consolidate its control over the population by establishing its administrative-political system throughout the entire population.²⁵

Having achieved a complete organization of the population by means of the psychological offensive, the insurgent movement can now move to that goal established by Professor Zawodny, providing a man with the moral justification for committing violence.²⁶ The final constructive technique of a psychological offensive is the definition of the philosophical basis for the movement and the alignment of the goals of the insurgency with the desires of the people. Once this end has been achieved, the insurgent movement is psychologically prepared to begin guerrilla warfare.

²⁴Jean Larteguy, The Praetorians, trans. Xan Fielding (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 276-283.

²⁵Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, p. 230.

²⁶Zawodny, op. cit., p. 10.

There is a vast body of printed material on guerrilla warfare. In most cases a paper or a book on guerrilla warfare makes note of its association with antiquity (Tacitus' history of the Roman invasion of the British Isles tells of the difficulty the Roman Army experienced as their attempt to "go beyond the pale" was turned back by the people of the countryside who had dyed their skins blue before battle). Then, after paying due credit to the guerrillas who fought Napoleon in the Peninsular War (1808-1812), the books go on to relate the exploits of Lawrence's Arabs, the World War II partisans, and the Indo-Chinese who defeated the French in 1954. Although there is usually some mention of the adventures of Francis Marion (the Swamp Fox), I have found no body of writing which looks upon the American Revolution as an insurgency in which George Washington's guerrilla army was the primary military force. As a matter of fact, a good case can be made for the American Revolution as a typical example of a movement which ran the entire spectrum of insurgency.

With respect to guerrilla warfare, the embattled farmer of Concord was as much the initiator of organized guerrilla warfare in his own time as is the "part-time guerrilla"²⁷ of today. And in our discussion of the lower level of guerrilla warfare (as opposed to Mao's war of movement) it is the part-time guerrilla who gives it its characteristics. Unlike his brother in arms, the full-time guerrilla fighter who makes up the military force of the guerrilla war of movement, and the uniformed soldier of the conventional army, the part-time guerrilla cannot afford recognition as a soldier. He does not withdraw

²⁷Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy," Orbis, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1958), p. 77.

from community life, but rather depends for his effectiveness on his ability to lead two lives.²⁸ Drawing from personal experience I can demonstrate the effectiveness of this particular characteristic.

On 14 July 1962 a nineteen truck convoy escorted by two companies of paratroopers from the 3rd Airborne Battalion of the Airborne Brigade, Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam (ARVN) was ambushed on National Highway 13 approximately five kilometers south of Xa Bau Long, a small village of Binh Duong province. Because the soldiers riding in the convoy reacted well after the first burst of fire and the accompanying mine explosions, the ambush lasted only ten minutes. As a result of the ambush twenty-one government soldiers, one officer, and one U.S. officer-advisor were killed, twenty-three others were wounded, and the guerrillas escaped into the jungle with several weapons (mostly automatic weapons) and two radios seized from the trucks during the fire fight. Subsequent examination of the site revealed that the ambush stretched approximately 1200 meters along the road and that the size of the ambush force was approximately four hundred persons. The government reaction was timely and appropriate. Within one and one-half hour's time of being notified of the attack three battalion-size forces converged on the area of the action executing a planned entrapment of the guerrilla force before it could escape from the jungle patch in which it was travelling. One force was committed in pursuit from the road which had been the scene of the ambush. Another was lifted to the area by helicopters. I accompanied the third which entered the area by parachute. The heliborne force and the airborne force were to move toward each

²⁸Ibid., p. 78.

other along a stream which marked the limit of the far edge of the jungle, and thus prevent the ambushers' escape. The force from the road entered the near edge of the jungle to act as a pusher to force the guerrillas into the trap along the stream. Unfortunately, the pusher force encountered a small ambush and erroneously reported that it had made contact with and was engaging the guerrilla band. Immediately, the other two forces were ordered in to join the battle; and as a result the guerrilla band found a large gap through which they escaped late in the evening. A critique of the action written by a leader of the ambush party was captured in November, 1962; and it revealed that the guerrilla band had gathered to conduct the ambush during the night of 13-14 July and had dispersed late in the evening of the 14th. No mention was made of the source of the guerrillas who constituted the ambush party.²⁹

However, on the morning of 15 July at 0700 there were no able-bodied adult males in Xa Bau Long. By the time I left Xa Bau Long at 1300 more than sixty adult males had arrived in the village, some walking, some on bicycles, others riding on buses and trucks. Although none was armed or wounded, and there was no other evidence of any of them having participated in the ambush, it is reasonable to conclude that at least a portion of the ambush party came from Xa Bau Long.

This is not the first, nor has it been the last ambush to be conducted; but it is a typical action of organized guerrilla warfare and amply illustrates the nature and characteristics of this level of insurgency.

²⁹I have no documentation for this report. I have read it (in translation). The original overlay which accompanied the critique is filed with the after-action report of this operation in the files of the S-3, Airborne Brigade (ARVN). A facsimile of the overlay is in the possession of Brig. Gen. Robert H. York, USA.

First, let us examine the goals of guerrilla warfare as they appeared in the action of Xa Bau Long. The primary goal of guerrilla warfare, as is the goal of insurgency, is the undermining of established authority. This goal was gained particularly well by the conduct of the ambush. The destruction of authority is best impressed on the minds of the people by the destruction of the symbols of authority. In the case of the Xa Bau Long ambush, the army trucks which made up the convoy and their paratrooper escorts represented to all they passed the authority of the Viet Nameese government. The destruction of this convoy and the inflicting of heavy casualties on the elite troops guarding it was probably more effective as a psychological weapon aimed at destroying the government's public image throughout the immediate countryside than any number of leaflets, radio broadcasts, or even a raid on a local government outpost. That the guerrilla critique of the ambush was titled "We defeat the airborne! (Chung-toi giap nhay du!)" is significant comment on the morale effect of this ambush. As the authority of the government is undermined, two other goals of the insurgent movement can be realized. A successful guerrilla operation serves notice that the guerrilla control of a locality has increased, and that guerrilla recruiting effort can be intensified since the guerrilla leaders can offer an opportunity to potential followers to be on what is obviously the winning side.

In addition to the political-psychological gains accomplished by this ambush, the guerrilla force also made two significant gains of a purely military nature: it inflicted casualties on its enemy, and it improved its own logistical base by capturing weapons, ammunition, and radio equipment.

The techniques employed in accomplishing the guerrilla objectives

at Xa Bau Long furnish, in one brief action, an example of the characteristic techniques of guerrilla bands at this level of insurgency. The ambush party made excellent use of the terrain in the vicinity of the attack by using the jungle both to conceal the location of the ambush and to cover their escape. The conduct of the ambush showed that the guerrilla acted on timely, accurate information which was coordinated into a detailed plan. The suddenness of the attack revealed a high degree of discipline, especially with respect to fire control; the ability of the ambushers to break off the attack and to disperse rapidly revealed also a high level of training and response to leadership. Of course, these techniques are characteristic of any well planned and executed ambush, but the characteristic which makes this particular action typical of guerrilla warfare short of war of movement is that the guerrilla force apparently parted company as soon as the action was over and returned to their homes to wait for the next summons to duty.

The ambush at Xa Bau Long could have been executed by a guerrilla force conducting a war of movement, possibly it was. But the return of the men of Xa Bau Long after the action is an indication that the guerrilla activity in that vicinity had not reached the war of movement level of insurgency. The war of movement is conducted by full-time guerrilla units. Once the authority of the central government has deteriorated in an area to the extent that guerrilla forces can move about with impunity, then the transition from guerrilla warfare to war of movement is complete.

At first the tactics are the same: raids and ambushes; but as the force grows in numbers, training and equipment, and as it increases its control over the countryside, the guerrilla force gains the capa-

bility and confidence to assume the posture of conventional war. Mao Tse Tung is of the opinion that the final decision in revolutionary war can be gained only by forces which have achieved the level of war of movement.³⁰

One outstanding example of the action of a guerrilla force in the war of movement is the defeat of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. The Viet-Minh army accomplished a political, psychological, and military success as it applied the coup de grace to the French colonial rule in Indo-China. That guerrilla army used in this battle all the tactics of conventional warfare within its capability.³¹

All the levels of insurgency described thus far can be categorized an internal war. The last level of insurgency is external aggression. The goal of insurgency is the overthrow and replacement of established authority by the revolutionary movement. It is more than likely that the political philosophy of the insurgent movement will coincide with that of a foreign power which might be willing to exert military pressure or to commit conventional forces to assist the insurgent movement to accomplish its goal. Such forces can be expected to employ, if necessary, the full range of weapons and manpower at their disposal in order to accomplish their purpose. The threat of invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the North Korean Army invasion of South Korea in 1950, and the intervention of the Soviet Army after the Hungarian revolution in 1956 are all examples of external aggression employed in the conduct of insurgency. Whether external support covertly given an insurgent

³⁰Mao Tse Tung, op. cit., p. 151.

³¹Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army, trans. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 216.

movement - for example, the sanctuary afforded the Greek Communist guerillas by Yugoslavia (until 1949), Albania, and Bulgaria; or the supply of arms, leaders, and other volunteer fighters given the Viet-Cong by the Communist "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam" (North Viet-Nam) - can be considered as aggression, is a matter for political debate and is beyond the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER III

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

So far, this paper has defined insurgency in terms of its characteristics, from sedition to conventional war; in terms of its levels: clandestine organization, psychological operations, guerrilla warfare, and external aggression; and in terms of its goal, the overthrow and replacement of established authority. Having established these parameters for insurgency, it will proceed to citing the parameters for counterinsurgency and then to some conclusions about probable United States military forces' involvement in counterinsurgency operations.

Mr. Walt W. Rostow characterized a guerrilla war as "an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and in the hills; fought by the spirit and policy of those who run the local government."¹ In this statement Mr. Rostow has called our attention to the extremely personal atmosphere not only of guerrilla warfare, but of the nature of all the actions which must be taken to counter an insurgency of which guerrilla warfare is only a part. It goes without saying that the best means of countering insurgency is to prevent it. And as pointed out above, if the established authority is not only responsible in the office of its government, but is also attentive to the needs of its people and responsive to their desires, there should be no cause for insurgency;

¹W.W. Rostow, "Countering Guerrilla Warfare," New Leader, 41 (Jul-Aug 61), pp. 13-14.

and without a cause there should be no insurgent movement. But should an insurgency begin, it must be met, as quickly as possible, and defeated.

The defeat of the first level of insurgency, clandestine organization, depends mainly upon the efficiency of the national or local police or military intelligence organization. The much publicized penetration of the American Communist organization by the Federal Bureau of Investigation² is an example of how a potential insurgency can be neutralized by an efficient police system. Unfortunately, the clandestine organization, by its very nature, often defies penetration or neutralization because its existence remains unknown until its first overt acts begin.

The first acts of the psychological offensive in insurgency are so simple, seemingly so harmless, that even police actions take on the appearance of trying to kill a fly with a twenty-four pound sledge. What sort of authority can allow itself to be seen massing its total power against the fellow who scrawls slogans on the walls or who prints or passes out broadsides featuring anti-government propaganda? Still, these are the initial acts which are the signs of impending difficulty. True, general strikes, mass demonstrations, sabotage, and intimidation by terror are all a continuation of the psychological offensive at a greater intensity. But all these acts are a sign of war; and a government threatened by insurgency must marshal its forces to meet the threat or watch the insurgent movement grow at least to guerrilla war. The level of government action to counter such operations is dual-natured: an efficient police intelligence system must act to destroy

²Herbert A. Philbrick, I Led Three Lives (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952).

the underground organization; the government must begin a counter propaganda campaign which refutes the themes of the insurgent movement and which features a promise to the people to seek out and remove the cause for dissatisfaction which supports the insurgency. Roger Trinquier devotes almost half of his book Modern Warfare to discussion of the importance of police activity in countering revolutionary activity.³

The threat posed by organized guerrilla warfare can best be countered, at first, by a tightly knit combination of police and military forces. The police, of course, continue their intelligence effort through their close association with the people and establish the necessary controls to restrict movement or to deny contact between the guerrilla leaders and the people. The military forces provide a reserve or reaction force to meet the guerrilla military threat, and they provide additional forces to extend the capability of the police effort. Later, they might be employed to defeat the guerrilla force and prevent its return to an area. In addition, many services organic to military forces can be employed in civic action projects designed to bring the government and the people closer together. Of course, the government's propaganda campaign must continue as must the government's attempts to find the causes of popular discontent and remove them. The Republic of Viet-Nam (South Viet-Nam) is faced with the task today of applying extensions of these general rules to the specific case of advanced guerrilla warfare which threatens to turn into a war of movement. Both the Federation of Malayan States and the Philippine Islands adapted these rules to fit their individual cases and succeeded in defeating insurgent movements.

³Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 18-49.

Combating the war of movement and the war of external aggression requires the employment of military forces in conventional warfare. However, it must be borne in mind that both of these activities have grown out of an insurgent movement, and that the source of the problem is at home, among the people. The government battling in a conventional war against highly organized and well equipped guerrilla forces, or against a foreign army, must still turn within, and by intelligence, propaganda, and responsiveness to the people, attempt to destroy the insurgency which threatens its existence.

There are times, however, when a nation threatened with insurgency will require outside assistance; and when the insurgency threatens the national interest of the United States, it will be our policy to render that assistance.⁴ This portion of the discussion will deal with the probability of U.S. military involvement in rendering assistance in this circumstance. It is a passage which presents a series of assumptions which should provide the environment for the senior commander who must direct the U.S. counterinsurgent effort or advise the commander of the indigenous counterinsurgency forces. Although it draws on experience for illustrative examples, it is not an attempt to divine policy, nor is it a comment on the past. Its purpose is to develop a general case hypothetical situation in which the doctrine proposed by this paper can be employed.

Because clandestine organization, the lowest level of insurgency rarely comes to the attention of the local national government, except

⁴Rostow, op. cit., p. 15

for rumors and intelligence reports, there can be only an insignificant involvement on the part of the United States. Possibly the degree of U.S. military involvement might be the activities and reports of the attachés assigned to the diplomatic staff in the country. The nature of the psychological offensive in insurgency will not result in a significantly greater U.S. involvement.

Even for the local national government, the acts associated with the psychological operations level of insurgency are matters appropriately within the province of police jurisdiction. Possibly a discerning ambassador, knowledgeable in the nature of revolutionary war, might become aware of a developing insurgency and report it to the State Department or the Chief Executive. The attachés assigned to his office would report to the Department of Defense, and possibly the name of the threatened country would appear on a listing of probable trouble spots. Any further U.S. involvement on a unilateral basis would be extremely presumptuous. However, the ambassador might be instructed to inform the threatened regime that the United States would be receptive to a request for support.

As the pace of the insurgent movement quickens, we can expect a coincident increase in support. At first the military involvement on the part of the United States might be in the form of necessary material and then trained personnel especially in the field of technical skills. As the tempo of insurgency increases, more and more personnel of a wider variety of skills would arrive in the beleaguered nation. The growth of Communist insurgency to highly organized guerrilla warfare in South Viet-Nam since 1958 has been met with a corresponding growth in American involvement, especially in the area of military support. Since January,

1962, the number of U.S. advisors assisting in the training, staffing, and command of RVNAF forces has grown from 685 to more than 15,000. U.S. helicopter units have assisted by adding greatly to the mobility of RVNAF units as they combat the Viet-Cong guerrilla effort. In addition, over one million dollars in military aid are being expended daily.⁵

In a nation whose lack of sophistication, especially in the armed forces, leaves it dangerously short of leaders and planners, an insurgent threat might result in a request to the United States for key military personnel to fill key vacancies in the structure of its armed forces. Although no provision exists now for such a loan of military personnel, an agreement between the United States and that nation could result in a condition of secondment for American military personnel. Under this system volunteer military personnel whose qualifications are needed and acceptable in the threatened nation's armed forces could be placed on extended leave status by the parent U.S. services in order that they could be hired to serve as commanders and staff members of the nation in peril. The advantages of loyalty and control between the government and seconded personnel, and the command authority vested in qualified leaders and staff planners make this system appear more desirable than one which requires that highly skilled personnel serve only as advisors. The British Commonwealth has used this system during the Malayan emergency.⁶


At any rate, today the threat of guerrilla warfare as an insurgent tactic is such that selected military personnel from the United States can be expected to serve as, at a minimum, advisors to commanders and

⁵"Governments Come, Governments Go, but Viet-Nam War Rolls On," U.S. News and World Report, 56 (Feb 10, 1964), p. 46.

⁶R.L. Clutterbuck, speech, 15 Nov 63.

staff planners in the armed forces of a threatened nation.

The ultimate involvement of U.S. military forces in counterinsurgency is the committing of full strength U.S. combat units directly against the insurgent forces. It is inconceivable that such a commitment would be made against small guerrilla forces; but a good case can be made for full scale commitment against guerrilla forces whose activities have escalated to the war of movement or against forces employed in external aggression.



This chart presents in graphic form a summary of the preceding discussion of U.S. military involvement vis-a-vis each level of insurgency. The conclusions as to the possibility or probability of U.S. military involvement were influenced by three factors:

1. An estimate of the availability of U.S. Forces.
2. An estimate of the commitments of U. S. Forces on a worldwide basis.
3. Interpretation of past U.S. actions with respect to Greece, Indo-China, Hungary, Suez, Viet-Nam and the nations of Latin America.

Further investigation in this area of interest could refine these

conclusions but would not make a significant additional contribution to this paper. These conclusions with respect to U.S. involvement are reasonable, and they are sufficient to allow an assumption that an insurgency in a nation the United States has determined to support would result in some form of U.S. military involvement. They allow also a second assumption that United States military forces would become significantly involved either as advisors or participants in the problem of countering insurgency in another nation only when the insurgency would have reached guerrilla or conventional war proportions. Since there is in existence a large body of doctrine to guide senior military commanders fighting a conventional war, the remainder of this paper will be limited to the formulation of a doctrine for conducting military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign against a movement which has been identified by guerrilla activity. Such activity may vary from one area of a nation to another: from the complete guerrilla military and political control in base areas to nocturnal control in areas under part-time guerrilla control to challenging of government control by raids, ambushes, and acts of terror and intimidation. Naturally, any overt guerrilla activity would be supported by an underground organization, and would have as its goal the overthrow and replacement of established authority.

It is axiomatic that the profitable employment of military forces requires coordinated effort. And it follows logically that such coordinated effort itself requires some form of direction in order that the effort gain the end for which it was initiated. In military operations this direction comes from the weighing of three factors: the commander's mission and his mission analysis; the forces available to him; and his estimate of the situation. All of these combine to provide a concept

for action which the commander will follow to accomplish his assigned task. However, the forces available to the commander and the immediate situation combine to provide a singular opportunity for the application of doctrine rather than doctrine itself. Therefore, the doctrine formulated in the succeeding chapters will be derived from a philosophy for counterinsurgency based on an analysis of the overall mission facing the counterinsurgent commander.

In the simplest terms, the mission of the senior commander engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign is: "Win the war." But how does one win the war against an insurgent movement? The answer is clear. Victory in a counterinsurgency campaign will be achieved when the insurgent forces have been defeated and when a recurrence of the insurgency has been prevented. The overall task facing the counterinsurgent commander is threefold:

1. He must defeat the insurgent forces.
2. Within the limits of his capability and authority he must eliminate the conditions which caused the insurgency.
3. He must develop and maintain the capability to prevent the recurrence of the insurgency as a military threat both from within the nation and from an external source.

The next three chapters will deal with each of these tasks separately.

CHAPTER IV

DEFEATING THE GUERRILLA

The method for defeating insurgent force depends on understanding what insurgent force is and isolating the prerequisites it must possess to operate successfully. The militant force of insurgency is the guerrilla force, often called the guerrilla. Earlier, this paper presented a distinction between the full and part-time guerrilla, and it shall continue to make the distinction. However, during this portion the discussion will deal with the guerrilla as he appears to his adversary, an armed insurrectionary whose goal is the overthrow of established authority. Full-time or part-time, regular, provincial, or local, at the time he is acting as a guerrilla, he must be considered only as a guerrilla and treated accordingly.

Che Guevara sees the guerrilla force as the "fighting vanguard of the people deriving its strength from its roots in the mass of the population. . . .The guerrilla force is a self-contained unit free to move anywhere, and there are always large areas unguarded by the enemy."¹ Even the part-time guerrilla is an integral part of that vanguard. As such he bears arms openly as a member of a military force and accepts the discipline necessary to form an effective combat unit. As Guevara said, he is a member of the army of the people in revolt.²

This brings us to a characteristic of the guerrilla which sets him

¹Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 17.

²Ibid, p. 18.

apart from the members of a regular military force. Since the guerrilla fights to overthrow the authority of an established order, he is considered as an outlaw by the regime. If he is successful, he might see his guerrilla force transformed into a regular army as were the forces of Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro. If he fails, he faces punishment as a traitor.

Of further significance in Guevara's reference to the guerrilla as the fighting vanguard of the people is the inference that the people support the aims of the guerrilla. Naturally all guerrilla movements claim popular support; and as stated earlier, Mao Tse Tung stresses the necessity of aligning the political objective of guerrilla warfare with that of the people in order to gain their support.³ The guerrilla force is the army of the people. When engaged in guerrilla activities, the guerrilla is a fighting man who bears arms as a member of a disciplined military force fighting to destroy the authority of the regime in power.

What are the prerequisites for guerrilla success? It is axiomatic that the guerrilla must have the support of the civilian population if he is to operate successfully. Two other elements which are prerequisite to successful guerrilla operations are a secure base (or bases) and the capability for offensive action. Although guerrilla forces consider rough or difficult terrain as favorable terrain,⁴ such an element should not be considered as a prerequisite for success. The Viet-Cong forces in An Xuyen province, South Viet-Nam, based in the U-Minh forest on the

³S.B. Griffith (trans.), Mao Tse Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 43.

⁴Guevara, op. cit., p. 23

Gulf of Siam coast, supported by the people in the area since 1945, conduct successful offensive operations in a flat, open area offering excellent visibility and long fields of fire across vast rice paddies.⁵

An effort has been made in this paper to establish the existence of the interdependence of the guerrilla and the population with respect to their pursuit of a common cause. Aside from the political or moral support, the guerrilla gains four other advantages from popular support.

The guerrilla relies on the population as a form of concealment or absorption agent. The part-time guerrilla, once he has completed a military mission, caches his weapon and other identifying military paraphernalia and returns home to his normal pursuits. The full-time guerrilla, if hard pressed by superior forces, simply disappears among the people. Either he becomes a peasant working in the fields or a street cleaner; or he is hidden by a sympathizer; or his pursuers are sent off in the wrong direction by a sympathizer.

As it is to all military forces, intelligence is of great value to the guerrilla. Since he is not normally equipped with all the reconnaissance and surveillance means available to conventional forces, the guerrilla must rely heavily upon the population for information of enemy plans and troop movements. Knowing the enemy dispositions, the guerrilla, his own movements screened by the population, can concentrate for the attack, achieve victory through surprise, and then rapidly withdraw or disperse into the countryside.

The people furnish logistic and financial support to the guerrilla. If the guerrilla unit is to grow and train to become a significant military force with full mobility, it must have popular support. As the

⁵Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (London: Pall Mall Press, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 366.

guerrilla force becomes stronger in an area, the leader organizes the people of the area as a support force. In due time each village will have its political leaders, intelligence agents, informers, and tax collectors. As his control tightens, the guerrilla leader will develop a phantom government for the area and will establish a system of parallel hierarchies to solidify his control. Ideally, such organization will make each citizen feel that he is a part of the insurgent movement. To increase the feeling of participation each person will be required to make some contribution of one kind or another. And if some element of the population should refuse to cooperate, a terror group will select a representative of the recalcitrants and force him into line or execute him.⁶ Even though the guerrilla force has not acquired a full one-hundred per cent support from the people, so long as it has free access to the population, it can demand and will receive support.

The second prerequisite for guerrilla war is the secure base. Mao Tse Tung defines the secure base in terms of function. The guerrilla base is a strategical base to enable the guerrillas to carry out their strategical task, to maintain and develop themselves to destroy and expel the enemy. He continues:

War without a rear is of course a characteristic of guerrilla warfare, as it is separated from the general rear of the state. But guerrilla warfare cannot survive for long and develop itself without a base, and such a base becomes the rear of the guerrillas.⁷

For the part-time guerrilla, his permanent base is his own home or his own community. At the time he is summoned to conduct guerrilla activity, his temporary base is the meeting point at which he receives his instructions or his initial orientation as to the extent of the next

⁶Fall, op. cit., p. 137.

⁷Mao Tse Tung, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 135.

operation. If the operation is lengthy, the part-time guerrilla might find himself in several base areas before he returns home. These bases will probably have been selected by the full-time guerrilla leader, the professional planner and commander of the guerrilla force.

The physical characteristics of the guerrilla base vary according to the size of the guerrilla force to use it, the level and effectiveness of the counterguerrilla force operating in the vicinity, the amount of time the base will be used and the activities which will take place there, the degree of support expected from the population, and the location of the base itself. Of these factors the location of the base is the most important.

If the guerrilla base is located in an area where popular support is lacking, the risk of discovery and destruction is quite high. Even a base located in the guerrilla area is always subject to capture and destruction by the forces of the government. Ideally, the base should be outside the war zone - an area which is closed to penetration by the forces of the established government. Guerrilla forces since the end of World War II have made extensive use of such "active sanctuary,"⁸ and it is significant that guerrilla forces which did not have active sanctuary were eventually defeated. The Huks in the Philippines and the MRLA guerrillas in Malaya never possessed an adequate outside sanctuary.⁹ The Greek ELAS forces conducted their operations from sanctuary in Yugoslavia until 1949 when Tito broke with the Soviet Union. The defeat of

⁸Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1963), p. 293.

⁹Seminar, Counter Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines (Held at Fort Bragg, N.C., 15 Jan 61), p. 24.

S.N. Bjelajac, "Malaya: Case History in Area Operations," Army, 12 (May 62), p. 32.

the ELAS followed shortly thereafter, and the denial of the Yugoslavian sanctuary was one of the main factors contributing to that defeat.¹⁰

The Viet-Minh under Ho Chi Minh and the command of Vo Nguyen Giap provide an example of the successful use of active sanctuary. Although the Viet-Minh guerrillas had been fighting the French since 1946, by 1949 the two forces had reached an active stalemate.¹¹ In November, 1949, the victorious Chinese communists arrived at the northern border of French Indo-China. Giap took advantage of the friendly communists to the north and moved his force, including recruits, to sanctuary in Red China. There, safe from the French, they were armed, equipped, and trained. In October, 1950, Giap returned across the border with fourteen battalions of infantry and three battalions of artillery and attacked the French south of Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai.¹² The guerrilla war in Indo-China was transformed into a war of movement conducted for three years from a base protected by active sanctuary. Dien Bien Phu followed in May, 1954; and the French withdrew from North Viet-Nam in July of that year.¹³ Active sanctuaries pose a serious problem to the non-communist world today. The governments of the Republic of (South) Viet-Nam and Laos are menaced by a guerrilla force supplied and directed from active sanctuary in North Viet-Nam.¹⁴ Ninety miles off the coast of Florida an active sanctuary for communist insurgency is being readied as a secure

¹⁰J.C. Murray, The Anti-Bandit War (Fort Bragg, N.C.:U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 29 Sep 62), Part I, p. 9.

¹¹Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, p. 108.

¹²Fall, Ibid., p. 108.

Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army, trans. (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 22.

¹³Giap, Ibid., pp. 164-176, 206-217.

¹⁴Department of State, U.S., A Threat to Peace, Part I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 38-40.

base for guerrilla operations in other Latin America nations.¹⁵ A recent pamphlet published in the interests of the Portuguese government claims that the present terrorist insurgency in Angola operates from sanctuary in the Republic of the Congo.¹⁶ As long as insurgent forces have active sanctuary in which to prepare plans, reorganize, train and equip their forces, they can continue to operate effectively.

The third prerequisite for guerrilla warfare, retention of an offensive capability, is what gives the guerrilla the initiative. The guerrilla as well as the regular soldier recognizes the offensive as the key to decision in combat. But the conventional force is at least designed to conduct defensive as well as offensive action. The guerrilla force, on the other hand, is not so versatile. When the guerrilla loses the initiative, he must immediately change his tactics so as to alter the situation and regain an offensive capability. This thinking is reflected in the guerrilla dictum that if, during the guerrilla conduct of an attack or ambush, the enemy finds time to reload his weapons, the attack must be halted and the guerrilla force withdrawn.¹⁷ Another evidence of the recognition of the importance of initiative during guerrilla warfare is the doctrine which requires immediate attack against an ambush by the "intended victim" force.¹⁸ Mao stresses the requirement for offensive capability and retention of the initiative when, after several

¹⁵B.B. Richardson, "Where U.S. Won and Castro Lost in Latin America," U.S. News and World Report, 52 (16 Dec 63), pp. 92-94.

¹⁶Death on the March in Angola (n.p.d.), p. 4

¹⁷J.K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivation, Escalation," The Annals, 341 (May 62), p. 12.

¹⁸Viet-Nam, Republic of, Department of Defense, BT 16-10, "Special Technique Against Guerrilla Warfare," Vol. i, pp. I-24, I-25.

chapters on guerrilla warfare, he sums up:

Although many things have been touched upon in our discussion, they all revolve around the offensive in campaigns and battles. Initiative can be secured only after a victorious offensive. All offensive operations must also be organized on our own initiative and there shall be no offensive forced upon us. Agile disposition of forces revolve around the offensive fight; The offensive is the only means to destroy the enemy as well as the main method to preserve one's self.¹⁹

The listing of these three prerequisites for insurgency, support of the population, a secure base, and the retention of the initiative, should not be construed as denying the importance of leadership or of sufficient cause for rebellion. By the time the insurgency has reached the level of guerrilla warfare these factors have already made their effects felt. As for the factors of popular support, the secure base, and the retention of the initiative, they are, for guerrilla operations, like the legs of a tripod. No one is "the most important"; the guerrilla depends for success on the interaction of the three, and the loss of one surely reduces the effectiveness of the others.

As long as the guerrilla has popular support, he can feel secure in his local base. The knowledge that the base is secure allows the guerrillas to act on a high degree of initiative and to maintain the offensive in his role as the army of the people. Success, of course, breeds success; the continued success of offensive operations convinces the people of the invincibility of the guerrilla movement and thereby ensures continued popular support.

The defeat of the guerrilla, the insurgent military force, is the first task of the military commander. Only when the guerrilla and the

¹⁹Mao Tse Tung, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

threat he represents have been removed can the commander begin the additional tasks of removing the conditions which caused the insurgency and establishing the means to prevent its recurrence. This is not meant to imply that the guerrilla force which threatens a nation must be defeated throughout the nation before operations to accomplish the remaining tasks can begin. However, it is logical to assume that these two tasks can be insurmountable while a guerrilla force remains in an area of interest. Such a force would do everything within its capability to interfere with or to prevent the accomplishment of these tasks. The remainder of this portion of this paper will deal with the defeat of the guerrilla force.

The task of defeating the guerrilla must be accomplished by depriving him of the support from the people, his base, and the initiative. The extremes in methods to accomplish this are the use of huge forces to bring about savage suppression of the countryside at one extreme, and the use of small anti-guerrilla guerrilla bands at the other. The total obliteration of the Czechoslovakian town of Lidice in 1942 furnishes an example of the use of suppression and mass terror as an attempt to crush guerrilla activity.²⁰

Two factors militate against the United States employing or advancing such a policy to defeat a guerrilla force: it is abhorrent to the traditional philosophy which extols the value of the human being; also, suppression, to be effective in an entire nation, would require an expenditure of troops far beyond the economic capabilities and political desires of a nation whose human resources are less than those of

²⁰"Nazis Blot Out Czech Village; Kill All Men, Disperse Others," New York Times, Vol. XCI, No. 30819 (11 Jun 42), pp. 1, 7.

Soviet Russia, China, or India. In addition, suppression itself does not lead to the accomplishment of the task of removing the cause of the insurgency.

At the other extreme is the method of using anti-guerrilla guerrillas. In any specific area, however, there can be only one guerrilla force; and if the insurgent guerrilla has already gained ascendancy, his already obtained intelligence sources in the population will expose the foreign guerrilla and his bases to destruction. During the war against the Viet-Minh in Indo-China the French attempted to employ as many as twenty thousand counter-guerrilla guerrillas. Although these troops achieved some positive results of a short term value, the units never equalled the effectiveness of the Viet-Minh guerrillas. When the French withdrew from Indo-China in 1954, there were still GCMA (Groupe Commando Mixite Aeroportee) forces in operation; but they were small, scattered, and militarily ineffective. The last contact with GCMA units was lost in 1959.²¹ The British and Malaysians employed anti-guerrilla guerrillas against the MRLA (Malayan Revolutionary Liberation Army). These forces, however, did not act as guerrillas as much as long-range patrollers. Their function was rather to find the guerrillas and then to report them to the battalion forces charged with destroying them.²² In the campaign against the Huks, the Philippine forces formed "pseudo-gangs"²³ and attempted to penetrate the Huk organization.²⁴ Although these activities

²¹Fall, Street Without Joy, pp. 263-274.

²²Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 104.

²³A term used by Frank Kitson in his book, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie and Rockcliff, 1960), p. 65.

²⁴Seminar, Counter Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, p. 32.

are characterized by the use of small units, often in clandestine roles, they are not the activities associated with the genuine guerrilla activity. They are the activities of independent extended patrol units. The work of the U.S. Army Special Forces among the Montagnard tribes of Central Viet-Nam has produced several units of border patrollers.²⁵ But whether these units, although they use guerrilla tactics, could be considered as guerrillas is debatable. Except for the GCMA, who attempted to establish bases and to conduct operations deep in what was known to be Viet-Minh governed territory, the "anti-guerrilla guerrilla" is a reconnaissance-ambush force operating from friendly bases with the mission of preventing the success of an insurgent guerrilla movement by detection and harassment. To rely on guerrilla tactics alone is to declare, at best, a stalemate. The essence of guerrilla warfare is a preponderance of local intelligence clandestine assembly for action, and attacks against fixed posts or ambushes. In an area in which the guerrilla force has popular support or has gained control by terror, the employment of small independent forces using guerrilla tactics is begging the enemy to fight on his own terms. Only rarely will the government guerrilla gain information from a population it cannot protect. And without local intelligence the unit must wander blindly and hope that should it encounter an insurgent force, that force is not disposed to fight. There is no denying the effectiveness of small unit tactics against guerrilla forces. Far from it; to be effective, however, the efforts of the small unit must be related directly to the counterinsurgent activity of a larger force.

²⁵F.K. Kleinman, "Under the Green Beret," Army, Vol. 13, no. 3 (Oct 62), p. 43.

Guerrilla warfare can be conducted successfully only so long as it is popular with the guerrillas. The guerrilla soldier is not a drafted minion. Whether recruited voluntarily or by strongarm methods, he is still relatively free to part company with his guerrilla band when the opportunity presents itself. It would seem that only the fear of reprisal against his friends or family would keep the unwilling guerrilla in service. The rigors and hazards of guerrilla life are such that should the cause lose its attractiveness, the guerrilla would feel little compunction to remain in the insurgent force. So it is in particular with the part-time guerrilla. Once the revolutionary game becomes unprofitable or loses its appeal, more and more part-time guerrilla partisans will fail to answer muster. Every action in an anti-guerrilla war must have as its objective the diminishing of the attractiveness of the insurgent movement.

The first action toward the defeat of the guerrilla is the denial of his access to the people. And it must be noted here that for such a denial to be complete and effective, the separation of the guerrilla from the people must be accomplished on both the physical and ideological planes. In this portion discussion will be limited to the physical separation of the guerrilla from the people. The ideological separation is a task to be accomplished under the portion of the overall mission described as "removing the cause for insurgency," and "preventing its recurrence."

No national security force can expect to deploy effectively against each manifestation of guerrilla activity and still retain the initiative. If the political situation dictates that the national security force remain sensitive to guerrilla incidents to such an extent that the force

attempts to react to every incident, the guerrilla war is already lost. For the guerrilla, using only a relatively few people to create trouble in widely separated areas, can cause the government so to dissipate its military power that the government cannot concentrate sufficient force to conduct a meaningful war against the guerrilla. Only a government with unlimited money, troops, and material assets, could hope to achieve such a massive response to a ubiquitous guerrilla effort. Therefore, the commander of forces must consider concentrating in a single area and defeating the guerrilla there before moving to another area. Once he has militarily defeated or driven off the guerrilla force in an area, he must consolidate his gain by destroying and occupying the guerrilla base in the area, separating the people from the guerrilla, and taking action to retain the initiative to keep the guerrilla force off balance.

The physical separation of the guerrilla from the population requires two actions. First, a force strong enough to defeat or drive off the guerrilla force must seize the area of operations. Second, that force must remain in the area to prevent the return of the guerrilla so that the physical separation of the people from the guerrilla can insure the ideological separation of the two. Of these two actions the second is by far the more important. The mere movement of a military force into an area will probably cause a guerrilla force to leave. But not to stay to keep the guerrilla away from the people is to fail the mission.

Once the military force has gained ascendancy in an area it must act immediately to consolidate its gain. Having achieved an immediate separation of the people from the guerrilla, the force commander must establish road blocks, check points, and a system of constant, aggressive patrolling to widen the gap he has created. These are the actions

to keep the guerrilla away while the force commander consolidates his gain.

The goal of consolidation is to complete the physical separation of the people from the guerrilla. The separation is complete when the military force has proven it can keep the organized guerrilla force away from the people and has removed the internal threat of terror from the midst of the people. A hypothetical situation should assist in clarifying this point.

Assume that the government military force in an area has achieved sufficient troop density to make guerrilla activities unprofitable for the local guerrilla force. The regular force patrolling and route communication protection, curfew regulations, and other actions designed to reduce guerrilla mobility and the ability to concentrate have caused the members of the guerrilla force to choose among four alternatives:

1. Attempt to concentrate and fight the military force.
2. Leave the area of operations.
3. Resign, permanently or temporarily, for the guerrilla movement. The part-time guerrilla does this between actions.
4. Go underground (This is the normal course of action for the organizer of the movement. Like his resigning compatriot, he joins the populace, ready to begin his guerrilla activity again as soon as the pressure is off).

Of these four alternatives, the first two, the attempt to fight, or to depart from the area, both assist the military commander in his initial mission of driving off the guerrilla force. Since the troop density is sufficient to cause the guerrilla to choose among these alternatives, the military force can defeat the guerrilla in an open fight. If the guerrilla force departs, the government force gains two significant advantages. The guerrillas have separated themselves from

the people, and the guerrilla force has given up the terrain with which it is most familiar. The choice of these alternatives by the guerrilla accomplishes the first phase of the task of separating the people from the guerrilla.

Not all of the guerrilla force will accept the "leave or die" option. For a variety of reasons: unwillingness to leave the land or family, fear of reprisals against their families, a desire to lie low to see which force will gain ultimate ascendancy in the area, a determination to remain in the area to provide an organizational focus for guerrilla resurgency, or any other reason, a number of guerrillas will disappear into the local population. It is the function of the force commander to remove this remaining threat during the consolidation of the area.

The threat is of a dual nature: the part-time guerrilla who has decided to adopt a "wait and see" attitude; and the hard core insurgent who has gone underground to wait for the opportunity to renew his former activity. The first of these, the suspended part-time guerrilla, will be discouraged from the pursuit of his former insurgent activity by the announcement by the government force commander that the military force and government administration have come to stay and by the establishment of systems of population control. Once the part-time guerrilla has been identified by an identity card which carries his photograph, fingerprints, and a block or family identification symbol;²⁶ once the curfew is clamped down, and road and trail check points have reduced his heretofore uninhibited travels; and once he has found that

²⁶Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 29-34.

active military patrols have closed the perimeter of the area both to his uncontrolled movement out and the movement of other guerrillas in, the part-time guerrilla will become a former guerrilla, perhaps ready to fight again, but unwilling to start any activity on his own. As long as the military force remains, the part-time guerrilla will be one of the population, and he will be physically separated from the guerrilla movement. Until he is ideologically separated, however, he remains a threat.

But now, what about the hard-core insurgent, who is also hidden among the people? As a member of the hard core, he is probably a political realist; and once he has decided that he cannot hope to see a return of insurgent control, he can surrender or leave of his own volition. As long as he stays, however, he represents to the people the power and spirit of the guerrilla force. Therefore the task of physically separating the people from the guerrilla is not complete, and will not be completed, until the hard-core insurgent has been eliminated.

The elimination of the hard-core insurgent is an intelligence task. How long it will take depends upon the degree of control he had exerted upon the people of the area and the means he used to achieve and maintain it. If he had gained and held his control by persuasion and by being responsive to the needs and desires of the people, his elimination might not be accomplished until a significant degree of ideological separation of the population and the guerrilla movement has been achieved. And even then, the informer who compromises him might be scandalized by the rest of the people. If he had gained and held his control by means of terror and intimidation, he will remain safe among the people as long as they are not individually convinced that the government

force can protect them and their families from guerrilla reprisal. Of course some person motivated by a desire for revenge might belie this premise, but his action would be a departure from normal. Once the protection of the people can be guaranteed by the government force, however, the hard-core insurgent's days will be numbered, and his departure or elimination should guarantee the physical separation of the people from the guerrilla.

A second task necessary to the defeat of the guerrilla is the denial of a secure base. Like the separation of the guerrilla and the people, the denial of a secure base must be regarded on two levels. The secure base of the guerrilla is the location of his physical and moral support. Since the denial of moral support hinges upon the ideological separation of the guerrilla and his population base, it will be included later in the discussion of the major tasks of removing the cause of the insurgency and preventing its recurrence.

Like the denial of the guerrilla's physical access to the population, the denial of a secure physical base depends upon area control. In determining the priority of terrain objectives with the idea of denying a secure base in mind, the counterinsurgent commander must be fully aware of the terrain features which the guerrilla calls favorable terrain. The most favorable terrain is located in zones difficult to reach because of dense forests, steep mountains, or impassable deserts or marshes.²⁷ Ideally, this area should also be sufficiently supplied with water and food growing potential to the extent required to sustain the guerrilla

²⁷ Guevara, op. cit., p. 29.
Mao Tse Tung, op. cit., p. 137.

force. Usually, however, most areas cannot sustain the force; and therefore, an additional requirement exists for the guerrilla base to be located close enough to populated areas to assure a continuing food supply and a flow of recruits. And, of course, the base should be so located as to require minimum movement by guerrilla units to reach those objectives which have been selected for them. Che Guevara estimates that a guerrilla force, moving by foot, can travel 30 to 50 kilometers in a single night.²⁸ Finally, wherever the base is established, an indispensable condition must exist: the population must be disposed to support the guerrilla force by collecting food, providing transportation, hospital care, and such other facilities as tool shops. And, of course, the guerrilla depends on his contact with the population to provide him information on the movement of government forces.²⁹

The base described here is not the gathering point or rallying point for part-time guerrilla operations, although these points are also selected according to the same criteria. This base is what Mao calls the strategic base; and in this case, it is located within the boundaries of the nation under insurgent attack. The use of externally located safe haven bases constitutes a different problem and will be discussed later.

A review of the actions of insurgent forces since World War II will reveal that guerrilla forces apparently chose their bases according to the criteria described here. The ELAS forces in Greece chose as their base areas the Vitsi and Grammos mountain areas north of the Thessaly plain and the mountainous areas of Peloponnessus in the south. Although these bases were located in steep mountain areas, they were also located

²⁸Guevara, *ibid.*, p. 30.

²⁹Charles W. Thayer, *Guerrilla*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 91.

so that the guerrilla force could be assured of support. The guerrillas in the Vitsi and Grammos areas in Greece gained their support from the friendly communist countries of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia (until 1949). Those in the mountainous Peloponessus area gained their support from the more populous portion of Southern Greece.³⁰ Another insurgent movement which made profitable use of mountainous terrain as a base from which to originate and control its operations was the Castro revolution in Cuba. The rugged back country of the Sierra Maestre mountains in Oriente Province proved strong enough to prevent penetration by the Batista forces during the formative stages of the rebellion, and it provided the secure base for the Castro forces throughout the revolution.³¹ Mount Arayat, on the island of Luzon, another mountain base, was the center of "Huklandia" during the Huk campaign in the Philippines.³²

Jungle areas, like mountainous areas, provide protection for the guerrilla base by nature of their impenetrability. For the MRLA in Malaya, the jungle provided protection; but it could not provide food in amounts sufficient to sustain the guerrilla force. Although the jungle provided security, the lack of food forced the guerrilla to limit the depth of the base area according to the availability of food to be found in the villages which bordered the jungle.³³ On the other hand,

³⁰Murray, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 2-3.

³¹Merle Kling, "Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare," The Annals, 341 (May 62), p. 46.

³²Seminar, Counter Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, map facing, p. 4.

³³Joseph P. Kutger, "Irregular Warfare in Transition," Military Affairs, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (Fall, 1960), p. 121.
Lucien Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 99.

the Viet-Cong guerrilla operating in the Delta area gains a significant advantage by using the U-Minh forest on the coast of the Gulf of Siam. Here, the jungle provides security and at the same time, as Bernard Fall says: "You have to push down on the rice to keep it from growing."³⁴

The bases discussed so far have been those located within the confines of the nation under insurgent attack. The most secure base, however, is that located in an active sanctuary area. In modern times guerrilla forces have made extensive use of externally located bases. Many writers point out that the guerrilla movements which were supported by bases located outside the nations' borders succeeded; those which did not have outside bases failed. Probably the most dramatic example of the value of an external base can be found in the Greek experience. Until July, 1949, Greek guerrilla forces found sanctuary in Yugoslavia. At that time, however, Marshal Tito withdrew his support of the guerrillas and closed the border. The Greek national forces under Field Marshal Papagos destroyed the guerrillas in the Visti-Grammos area in August, 1949; and the Greek guerrilla war was at an end.³⁵

The denial of a secure base is a matter of occupation, destruction, interdiction of the base area, or a combination of the three. Since the denial of an external base, or sanctuary, is a matter for international political discussion or action, the first two methods, destruction or occupation, will be beyond the authority of the military commander for whom this paper is being written. His problem in this area will be finding the means to interdict the sanctuary base effectively.

³⁴Bernard B. Fall, interview, 10 Feb 63.

³⁵Murray, op. cit., Part IV, p. 9.

The denial of a secure base depends first of all upon locating it. The means to this end are many and highly dependent upon the imagination of the counterinsurgent commander. Information gained from the population or from captured insurgents can lead to the location of the guerrilla base. A concentrated aerial reconnaissance effort in areas of likely base locations will pay dividends. Magsaysay penetrated guerrilla bands with ex-guerrillas who later led government forces to the guerrilla base.³⁶ British forces in Malaya used vigorous small-unit patrolling by troops made so familiar with small areas that they could notice small changes in attitude or appearance in an area.³⁷ At this time in South Viet-Nam the national armed forces make good use of small patrols by Ranger-type units and battalion size sweeps through suspected localities. The listing of techniques for locating guerrilla bases could continue, but it would add little to the development of this paper to do so. The methods listed here are typical of those employed by counterinsurgent commanders in recent experience.

The mere location of a guerrilla base does not deny its use. Once the base has been located, something must be done about it. Of the methods of base denial previously mentioned, permanent occupation of a base is the surest form of denial. However, because of remoteness, or size, or the concentration of guerrilla strength in a base area, the physical occupation of the area might be too difficult for the government force to accomplish initially. For example, the Greek Army began a campaign

³⁶Seminar, Counter-Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, p. 32.

³⁷R.L. Clutterbuck, speech, 15 Nov 63.

against the ELAS base in the Grammos mountain area on 29 June 1948. For two and one-half months 15,000 guerrillas defended themselves successfully and then withdrew into Albania. Although the government forces had captured the area, other guerrilla activities forced an abandonment of the Grammos area. It was recaptured in August, 1949 and occupied at that time. The occupation of the Grammos and Vitsi areas signaled the end of the ELAS movement.³⁸ Until he can occupy a base area, therefore, the counterinsurgent commander must try other means to deny its use. Destruction of the area is one of these.

The destruction of a secure base denies its full use to the guerrilla, at least temporarily, and lowers its value to the insurgent movement. The guerrilla forces use their base areas to provide a secure location at which they can train recruits, refit and repair equipment, care for their wounded, reorganize units and plan future operations. A base, once located, should be destroyed as soon as possible. A raiding force equipped with demolition materials and incendiary devices can disturb guerrilla planning and activity for quite some time. If necessary or desirable, aircraft can seed a precisely located base area with delay-fused bombs set to explode over a period of weeks or months, or set to explode immediately if the fuze is disturbed. If the guerrilla force is growing crops in the vicinity, the raiders must also destroy the crops. As much as possible, the destruction must be complete.

Once the government force leaves the base area, the guerrillas can rebuild the base if they desire; but the base, as well as having been rendered inoperable, has also lost its secure reputation. No guerrilla

³⁸D.G. Kousoulas, "The War the Communists Lost," Studies in Guerrilla Warfare (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1963), p. 88.

can rest comfortably in a base whose location is known to the government force. Therefore the destruction of a base will probably force the guerrilla to search for another nearby or leave the area.

Some bases, especially those located in active sanctuary, will defy occupation and destruction. Therefore they require other means to render them inoperable. An effective means is interdiction. If a base is in sanctuary, or if it is located in impenetrable terrain, interdiction of all the known routes leading into or out of the base will slow down the guerrilla activity. As in the destruction or occupation of the base, the interdiction of a base area requires accurate, timely intelligence. Naturally, interdiction is not as effective as occupation or destruction, but it can be used to deny the guerrilla full use of a secure base. Except for bases located outside the country, however, interdiction should be only a step to isolate a base area to deny its effectiveness. As soon as possible it should be destroyed or occupied by the counterinsurgent force.

Let us now concern ourselves with the problem of denying the guerrilla the use of a base located beyond the nation's borders. Three methods which may be used to limit the effectiveness of active sanctuary are:

1. Political and economic measures against the country permitting active sanctuary.
2. The employment of military force against the country or at least against the guerrilla force in the sanctuary area.
3. Interdiction by sealing off the border and coastline of the insurgency threatened nation in order to prevent or limit movement of supplies or forces into or out of the guerrilla areas.

The first two actions require decisions at the highest government levels and leave all the participants open to retaliation or to a new conflict which will have come about as a result of escalating the guer-

rilla war. To date neither strong political and economic sanctions nor military force against a nation furnishing sanctuary has been applied. If no one is willing or able to take direct action against the nation offering sanctuary, it becomes necessary to seal the borders and coasts of the threatened nation. This is a difficult task, particularly for a country like Viet-Nam where the border is long and marked by extremely difficult terrain, and the coastline is 2200 kilometers long.

The exact method of sealing the border will vary according to the circumstances existing in the area. In some situations guerrilla strength and control might be such that the government force might be forced to conduct offensive operations merely to gain access to the border itself. Once the ability to operate along a border has been gained, however, the counter-guerrilla force must take action to cut the guerrilla off from his sanctuary. Here again the techniques of interdiction come into play.

At first the counter-guerrilla force might have to rely on intensive combat and intelligence patrolling in the guerrilla territory. These patrols should use tactics similar to those used by the guerrilla to disrupt his supply system and to make guerrilla movement in the area difficult and dangerous. As the counter-guerrilla force gains strength, it should expand its operations to block, first, major, and then all routes used by the guerrilla in his movements across the border. As time goes by, it might become necessary to establish a sanitized zone in which only military forces are allowed to move. Such a zone would be patrolled, mined, and fenced off. It would be posted as a danger, or death, zone so that all might be informed of the consequences of entering the zone. Warning systems and alert forces should be prepared

to move quickly to block guerrilla intrusions in the zone. As the sealing off of the border continues, the counterinsurgent commander should consider the employment of air defense forces to prevent aerial supply of the guerrillas, and he should use naval coastal and river forces to complete the blockade.

Needless to say, sealing the border and establishing a sanitized zone is extremely expensive in terms of time, men, and materials. The effort of the French in Algeria cost three million dollars a day, six hundred thousand troops, over six hundred helicopters, the maintenance of a sea blockade around all of North Africa to include coastal surveillance flights; this effort was expended over a period of eight years, and the bulk of the effort was spent in sealing off Northern Algeria from Morocco and Tunisia.³⁹

The sealing of a border is virtually impossible without cooperation of the people in an area. As long as the guerrilla can find refuge in a friendly populace, he can risk crossing a sanitized zone. Thus we see that popular support must be won away from the guerrilla at the same time the counter-guerrilla force is acting to seal the borders. Concurrent with these operations the force must conduct offensive action to deprive the guerrilla of his initiative and to kill or capture him.

The third task to be accomplished to defeat the guerrilla is the denial of the initiative. Again, good intelligence and support from the people appear as important factors. The object of this task is to wrest from the guerrilla the mental mobility which has given him an advantage.

³⁹Bernard B. Fall, Counterinsurgency: The French Experience (Washington D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 18 Jan 63), pp. 16-17.

If we are to learn from history, we will discover that the most important form of initiative to be gained in countering insurgency is political initiative. It has been said that "an insurgent begins his fight with nothing more than a cause."⁴⁰ And, therefore, to gain the initiative the established authority must either discredit the cause or adopt the cause as its own and then pursue it energetically. Successful counterinsurgencies have been marked by such activity. The Malayan insurgency established as its cause freedom from British rule; the British countered by promising the Malaysians independence and establishing a date.⁴¹ In the Philippines the insurgency was centered around land reform and government corruption; Ramon Magsaysay brought land reform and purged the Philippine government of corrupt officials.⁴² The seizing of political initiative, however, requires authority to speak out and to act freely in the political field. Such authority is not usually delegated to a military commander except in extreme conditions. He must, however, be fully aware of the importance of gaining the initiative in the political field, and he must take every action within his authority and capability to see that it is gained and retained.

The counterinsurgent force can gain the military initiative by constant activity against the guerrilla force. If contact is gained, it must not be broken willingly. The pursuit of located guerrilla forces must be ruthless. If, during an operation, contact with the guerrilla force is lost, every effort must be made to regain that con-

⁴⁰William A. Lybrand, Support, People, Control, Influence (n.p.d.) p. 56.

⁴¹J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya (London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1962), pp. 278, 290-291.

⁴²Charles T.R. Boharman, "Antiguerrilla Operations," The Annals, 341 (May 62), pp. 25-26.

tact. Field Marshal Alexander Papagos described the principle he followed in defeating the ELAS guerrillas in Greece as "Continuous, relentless, unremitting pursuit, especially at night, so as to exhaust them and to force them either to fight or to disintegrate."⁴³

Such a pursuit at field army level will not be characterized by a precipitous, headlong rush, but by the steady, deliberate movement of forces so as to engage the guerrilla in a forcing game depriving him of popular support, secure bases, and the initiative by the inexorable progress of forces against him. Recognizing the offensive as the first principle of military operations against guerrillas and realizing now that controlled offensive action coupled with consolidation measures can deprive the guerrilla of secure bases and popular support, we can identify a second principle which must be applied to bring about the defeat of the guerrilla, the insurgent force. It is the principle of progressive operations.

The principle of progressive operations requires that as one phase of an operation ends in one area and a second phase begins, the government force must begin offensive operations in the next area and the next until the guerrilla force can be defeated.⁴⁴ Once the guerrilla force, the military arm of the insurgency, can be forced out of a specific area, the counterinsurgent commander can proceed to the second major task of his overall mission, the ideological separation of the people and the insurgent: the occupation of the moral base of the insurgency.

⁴³Alexander Papagos, "Guerrilla Warfare," Foreign Affairs, 30 (Jan 52), p. 247.

⁴⁴Throughout this portion of my paper, I am deeply indebted to Lt. Col. John R.D. Cleland for his allowing my free use of a private paper, "The Communist Guerrilla and his Defeat." (Lt.Col. Cleland's identification of the three prerequisites for guerrilla activity and the organization of the counterinsurgent are reflected in this chapter on the military defeat

CHAPTER V

REMOVING THE CAUSES OF INSURGENCY

Once the guerrilla force has been driven from the area of operations, the task facing the military commander is to recommend local policy for stabilization to the national or regional government. Then, in a manner consistent with national counterinsurgent policy, the military commander must conduct socio-political-psychological activities, or provide assistance to representatives of the government in their conduct of these activities. This task is that part of the overall mission described as removing the cause of insurgency.

This portion of the discourse will establish a frame of reference by which the counterinsurgency commander can assess the strength of the insurgent cause in the nation or an area of operations. Following that, it will continue to the general considerations which must be made and then the steps to be followed in removing the cause for insurgency once the national security forces have achieved ascendancy in an area. In another sense, this portion of the paper will deal with the factors the military commander must consider as the counterinsurgency shifts from the political defensive to the political offensive, and the purely military aspects of the campaign shift from offensive operations to active defensive operations.

Certainly the senior military commander engaged in counterinsurgency operations must begin to assess the strength of the insurgent movement in an area long before his forces enter the area itself. There-

fore he must insure that his intelligence collecting and evaluating effort consider all the dimensions by which the character of the area of operations is to be measured. To the long established factors of weather, terrain, and enemy, he must add the people. For it will be his awareness of the factors which control the behavior of the people, their social and political order, and their organization of their resources in support of their aspirations which will lead him to the best course of action in achieving the ideological separation of the population from the insurgent movement.

In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula lists "a cause" as the first prerequisite for a successful insurgency. In addition he also lists weakness of the counterinsurgent, geographic conditions, and outside support as additional prerequisites.¹ In addition to these are the factors of leadership and internal organization, or infrastructure. Just as the commander directs his efforts to deny the prerequisites of popular support, secure base and initiative in order to defeat the guerrillas, he must direct his efforts to denying to the insurgency the conditions which can lead to its success.

An insurgency does not come into being merely of its own volition; without a cause there can be no insurgency. And without leadership there can be no cause. For it is the function of the leader to give definition to discontent. Thus a cause is born. Abraham Lincoln once said that he who can "parse a cause" can capture it.

The local defeat of the guerrilla force and the concurrent driving underground of the remaining insurgent leadership represent a turning point in revolutionary-counterrevolutionary war. But as his forces gain ascendancy in an area, the military leader must keep in mind that

¹David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 18-25.

like Macbeth he has "but scotched the snake, not killed it." The most difficult portion of his mission lies immediately before him. For it is the task of restoring order and providing leadership without usurping authority or embarrassing the government he is committed to support. The difficulty of the task can be measured in terms of the degree of control the insurgency had held in the area and the degree to which the governmental administration has committed itself to the defeat of the insurgency. In the simplest case, the insurgency would have controlled an area only briefly and by means of terror and intimidation; at the same time the government, having devoted itself to being responsive to the needs and desires of its people, would send its administrators to the area to provide leadership and service as soon as the guerrilla force had been driven off. In the worst case, the insurgency could have controlled an area for an extended period using persuasion and effecting reforms; the government, interested only in control and power, would have merely ordered the military commander to restore governmental authority without further policy guidance. The first of these represents an ideal approach to counterinsurgency on the part of the government. The latter is doomed to failure, for no nation can long afford the military force necessary to sustain in power a disinterested administration.

Therefore, as a prerequisite for the task of removing the cause of insurgency, the commander must assess the strength of the cause itself. As pointed out in an earlier chapter the fundamental cause for insurgency is discontent. The nature of such discontent may have its roots in political, social, or psychological conditions; and its bases may be real or contrived; but the discontent itself is real.

Political discontent might arise from a belief in the mind of the people that their needs and desires are not receiving attention in the

halls of government. Or, as in the case of the Philippines before Mag-saysay and the honest election of 1951, the people might come to believe that their vote has been made worthless because of the corruption which has smothered their voice in the legislature.² On the other hand the wrath of a colonial people can be stirred by the belief that their lives and their national entity have been exploited for the benefit of foreign master. Or, they might believe that as colonials their status makes them second class citizens whose rights have been abrogated by the people of the motherland. Foreign exploitation, unequal treatment, and latent nationalism born of ethnic or experiential unity can mix and then await a spark to ignite the flames of insurgency. All of these combined in Hai-Phong, Tonkin, French Indo-China, and burst into flame with the explosion of shells from the French cruiser Suffren in the Viet-Nameese sector of the city on November 23, 1946.³ The same factors came together and were ignited by the torches of the Boston Tea Party "Indians" on December 16, 1773.⁴ In all of these cases, the rallying cry of the insurgent movement has been "Throw the rascals out." And it has carried the promise of removing the cause for discontent by destroying the established authority and replacing it with one tailored to meet the needs and desires of the people. It is important to note, however, that at first only the negative slogan is sufficient to give impetus to insurgency. In the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro harped only on the theme of "throw the rascals out" from 1956 until he entered Havana in triumph

²Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannon, Counter-Guerrilla Operations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 99.

³Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (London: Pall Mall Press, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 76.

⁴The New Information Please Almanac, Atlas and Yearbook, 1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 317.

in December, 1958. No positive policy was pronounced throughout the entire revolution. Only such generalizations as "liberty," "freedom," and "land reform" served to give positive sustenance to his cause.⁵ Negation of the Batista regime was enough. The American revolution for independence actually began on a negative note: "No taxation without representation"; but the Continental Congress saw the need for a positive statement of the goal of the insurgency. The Declaration of Independence is the positive statement of their political goals; and it, ironically, begins and ends with paragraphs steeped in grievances. In the rebellion against the French in Indo-China the Viet Minh held tenaciously to the theme of ridding the nation of foreign exploitation and at the same time promised to create a new nation for the Viet-Nameese people.⁶ Since the existence of both positive and negative goals gives greater moral strength to an insurgency, the commander faced with countering a politically based insurgency would do well to study the themes of the movement in order to determine whether his problem is one of "throwing the rascals out" before the insurgents are able to, or whether he must be prepared also to submit to the people an idea which will equal or better the positive goal of the insurgency. Ramon Magsaysay's ruthless policing of his governmental and military administrators and leaders furnishes evidence of the effectiveness of beating the insurgents to the rascals.⁷ The decision on the part of the British government to grant independence to Malaya played a heavy part in the collapse of the MRLA

⁵Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro: Rebel Leader or Dictator (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), pp. 166-172.

⁶Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 81-106.

⁷Carlos P. Romulo, The Magsaysay Story (New York: The John Day Company, 1956), pp. 126-134, 154-160.

rebellion. The British granted complete independence for Malaya on August 31, 1957.⁸ This had the effect of making the revolution the Malayan's war, for it put the MRLA in the position of fighting against the Malayan people in law as well as in fact, rather than against the British government. This action on the part of the British did not by itself bring about the end of the Malayan rebellion, but it did contribute significantly to the British-Malayan success.

Social discontent arises when one segment of the population becomes convinced that it is being taken advantage of by another segment of the same population. Such a situation exists when the laws of the nation, or the locality, discriminate against a specific population group. The theme of the Huks also included a villifying of Philippine land owners and money lenders who operated in connivance with corrupt officials to exploit the tenant farmer and the struggling poor.⁹ Absentee landlords are common targets for social discontent. If the landlord or the local supervisor turns out to be non-indigenous he often becomes also a foreign exploiter. The biggest cause for social discontent is the disparity between the per capita income of the very rich and the very poor coupled with the belief on the part of the poor that only violence will improve their lot. "Drive the undeserving and idle rich from your land" is the rallying cry of the insurgent leader. Land reform and job opportunities are his positive program. In addition to the theme of foreign exploitation to create political discontent, the Viet-Minh used absentee landlordism and land reform during their cam-

⁸J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya (London: Macmilland and Company, Limited, 1962), pp. 281-282.

⁹Robert A. Smith, Philippine Freedom, 1946-1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 143.

paing against the French from 1946 until 1954.¹⁰ Today the Viet-Cong use the same sources of discontent in the struggle to topple the government of South Viet-Nam.¹¹ The military commander can do very little to relieve this sort of discontent unless, of course, he has authority from the national government to enforce land reform or similar laws. But, even if he lacks the authority, his intelligence and civil affairs personnel can apprise him of the need for such laws, and he can recommend their passage.

Against a less severe form of social discontent the commander has a better chance to reduce the threat of insurgency. In this case the cause is tied merely to being a have-not. Here the insurgent leader tells his would-be followers of the wonders of a more advanced world, one of light-and-chrome medical facilities, irrigation programs, modern schools, and paved streets. He tells them of bountiful crops and modern roads to bring the produce to market. His followers hear of electricity and moving pictures, and, perhaps, modern plumbing. They also hear that a certain rascally group of their own countrymen have conspired to keep these wonders from the people. "Throw the rascals out" is his theme, "and the wonders will be yours." Against this theme the military commander can act with many of the facilities he has at hand. His medical, engineer, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel can assist him in bringing the new world to the old even though the insurgency has been defeated in that area. Once the people discover that the rascals can and will provide the shiny new world, there will be far less tendency toward violence.

¹⁰Truong Chinh, op. cit., pp. 83-88.

¹¹Jerry A. Rose, "The Peasant Is the Key to Vietnam," Anthology of Related Topics on Counterinsurgency (Lackland Military Training Center, Lackland Air Force Base. 1 Mar 63), p. 89.

The ability and willingness of a government to be responsive to the needs and desires of its people is paramount in removing the cause of psychological discontent. Psychological discontent arises from two general causes: dislocation and real or imagined oppression. In dislocation there is a feeling of being out of touch. A locality which feels that it is out of touch with its government soon falls prey to an insurgent group which steps in to fill a political vacuum. In this case the insurgents cry, "The rascals don't care about us, so we'll just set up our own government." If the rascals attempt to counter an insurgency in such an area, they become invaders or oppressors of the free people. Often in remote localities poorly selected representatives of national governments do become oppressive, or at least they can be made to appear so. In this case, the insurgent becomes a modern Robin Hood fighting in civil disobedience against a twentieth century Sheriff of Nottingham, duty appointed by a contemporary Prince John.

Even more explosive than local, or even national, political oppression is religious oppression. Man can much longer stand losing his worldly possessions than he can stand losing his chance for Eternity, Nirvana, Valhalla, or whatever his religion promises. Both the arousing and the alleviating of psychological discontent depend on symbols, symbol manipulation, and symbolic acts. Between May and November, 1963, Buddhist monks immolated themselves in symbolic protest against the Viet-Nameese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Their cause? Religious freedom - for Buddhists - symbolized by giving them the right to fly their religious flags on holy days of the Buddhist religion. The result? The toppling of the already unpopular Diem regime by coup d'etat - a form of insurgency. That the same military commanders who recommended against

the restriction on flying religious flags also brought about the coup d'etat¹² should not be taken as recommending that the military commander resort to insurgency in order to relieve psychological discontent, however.

The mere arrival of a national force in a locality and a raising of the flag might be sufficient symbolic action to begin a lessening of psychological discontent arising from a sense of dislocation. A population suffering from psychological discontent is frustrated because it realizes that it is missing something and yet it feels powerless to do anything about it. Ripe for rebellion, it will rally to any voice which promises to destroy the symbols of order. It becomes apparent then, that other courses of action to relieve the pressures of psychological discontent must include the opportunity for the people to "do something," and they must include some symbolic action or item which will tend to bring the individual closer to his government. In the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay instituted a policy by which any individual could send him a complaint or a suggestion by Postal Telegraph, collect. In addition, those suggestions which seemed best were rewarded by symbolic truck rides to Manila or a visit by government dignitary.¹³ According to newspaper accounts, Major General Nguyen Khanh, premier of South Viet-Nam, has followed Magsaysay's example by personally asking individual Viet-Nameese for their suggestions on the prosecution of the war against the Viet-Cong.¹⁴

¹²"Back of the Revolt in Viet-Nam," U.S. News and World Report, 55 (11 Nov 63), p. 41.

¹³Smith, op. cit., p. 171.

¹⁴"Top Man in Viet-Nam: General Khanh Grabs Power," U.S. News and World Report, 56 (17 Feb 64), pp. 43-44.

In assessing the strength of the cause for insurgency before acting to remove it, therefore, the counterinsurgent commander must survey the existing conditions in a locality to determine the form of discontent which has given rise to the insurgency. Then he must continue his assessment of the strength of the cause to determine the action he shall take himself and the recommendation he will make to the national political authority.

The second source of strength for an insurgent cause is its leadership. The driving off of the guerrilla force will have deprived the insurgency of a portion of its leadership. The problem facing the counterinsurgent commander now is to assess the strength of the insurgent cause in terms of its leadership factors: the character of the rebel leadership in the area of operations; the infrastructure established by the insurgents; and the method of population control they have employed. Once he has made this evaluation, the counterinsurgent will be better disposed to replace the departed leadership with a form most acceptable to the people of the area and the government he represents.

The pattern of insurgent leadership in an area may have run the gamut from the strong, individualistic leader who, by force of personality, brought the insurgency into being, to the committee-type leadership which characterizes most communist-inspired rebellious groups. In the case of the former degree of leadership, the counterinsurgent may make two assumptions with respect to the remaining strength of the insurgent cause in the area of operations. The first of these is that the insurgent movement in the area has been locally inspired, and that the underlying discontent is probably rooted in a local grievance. The other is that the defeat of the guerrilla force has probably deprived the

insurgency of the leadership it would require to reestablish itself in the locality. In this situation the advantage lies with the counterinsurgent. By defeating the guerrilla force in the area, he has symbolically, and actually, deposed the single righter of wrongs, and has rendered him ineffective. Once the local discontent has been relieved, the task of preventing the recurrence of the insurgency is greatly simplified. The former leader will have become a bandit.

On the other hand the insurgent committee leadership system poses a greater problem for the counterinsurgent commander. In this case the defeat of the guerrilla force need not have deprived the insurgency of its leadership in the area. For the organization of a committee system indicates two factors for consideration: the insurgency is a coordinated movement capable of counterattacking the counterinsurgent from outside the area of operations; the insurgency has equipped itself with a second generation of leaders and a controlling internal organization in the area. In this case the military defeat of the guerrillas represents only the simplest step in the destruction of the insurgent movement. In the case of the individually-led insurgency, the function of the counterinsurgent is merely that of restoring order and correcting a local deficiency. In the case of a coordinated, committee-led insurgency the counterinsurgent commander cannot consider his second task complete until he has restored order, alleviated the local discontent, rooted out all the leadership of the insurgency, and rendered its infrastructure ineffective.

The infrastructure of the insurgent movement is that which provides the leadership of the movement communication with and control over the population. Needless to say the longer and more thoroughly the insurgent force is in power in an area, the more open and more detailed

the organization. But regardless of the level of insurgency in an area, some form of infrastructure will exist. It is important to recall, here, that at the beginning of the insurgent movement three groups of people made up the population: those who would be hostile to the insurgent, those who would be apathetic, and those who would serve the insurgent movement. It was the function of this last group to win the support (or insure the neutrality) of the apathetic group and to neutralize the opposition.¹⁵ It is this group which provides the organizational framework for insurgency. On a national level it provides the phantom government which stands ready to take the reins of government. On a local level it cuts across all the levels and groupings of local society to provide information to the insurgent leadership and to transmit instructions to the population. A hypothetical example of such organization should clarify its function and explain its effectiveness.

Assume that an insurgent movement has gained ascendancy in an area and it has been able to organize the area as a support base. In all probability an organized guerrilla force in the area will be spending its time on tactical operations or in training and refitting for future operations. At the same time the insurgent leadership is establishing its infrastructure. Under insurgent supervision the population is divided into groups according to age, sex, religion, and occupation, for illustrative purposes. A member of the insurgent leadership who is a thirty-two year old, male, Taoist farmer has entry into each of these groups. At first, as these people talk among themselves, he can provide a pulse-beat of information to the other members

¹⁵S.T. Hosmer, et al., Counterinsurgency: A Symposium (Report prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, Jan 63), p. 9.

of the insurgent leadership; he can subtly recruit from each of these groups other members for the organization who then perform the same tasks in groups from which he is excluded (e.g., forty year old, male, Catholic butchers); and once his position of leadership in the insurgency is known to the members of his groups, he can authoritatively transmit to them instructions from the insurgent leaders. Such an infrastructure is called "hierarchies paralleles"¹⁶ by one author. It is called "the organizational weapon" by another.¹⁷

Regardless of the type of leadership or of the degree of its internal organization the insurgency's effectiveness depends upon its ability to control the population. Orders which are not obeyed are meaningless. Therefore, the insurgent leadership must evolve some form of authority by which it insures that its instructions to the people take on real meaning. Ideally, the people could be so motivated by the insurgent's persuasion, based on the popular discontent and the movement's promise, that obedience would be willing or even welcome in the minds of the people. But, from a practical point of view even obviously reasonable requests can come into conflict with personal desires and meet refusal. To make refusal less attractive anti-littering notices always include a warning about a fine which might be incurred. The same line of reasoning applies to the instructions issued by the insurgent leadership. The fine is usually some form of intimidation. The counter-insurgent commander can use the degree of intimidation the insurgent found necessary as an indicator of the relative strength of the cause

¹⁶Ximenes, "La Guerre Revolutionnaire et Ses Donnees Fondamentales," Revue Militaire d'Information, 281 (Jan-Feb 57), p. 12.

¹⁷Philip Selznich, The Organizational Weapon (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960),

in the area of operations. And if terror has been used extensively to sustain the insurgent control, the counterinsurgent commander can use the record of terror as a weapon to destroy the insurgency. The excesses of the Mau Mau at Lari, Kenya, in March 1953, caused defections among even the most loyal insurgent supporters and contributed to the setback of the Mau Mau insurgency.¹⁸

The remaining means of assessing the strength of the insurgent cause lies in the population. For it is only through the population that the counterinsurgent commander can discover the discontents which led to support of the insurgent movement; that he can uncover and render ineffective the insurgent leadership and infrastructure; and that he can obtain the source of intelligence and manpower to assist him in his task of preventing a recurrence of the insurgency.

In an essay "Support, People, Control, Influence," Dr. William Lybrand divided the entire population of a nation engaged in a battle against insurgency into seven groups:

1. Security forces
2. Government members
3. Government sympathizers
4. The uncommitted
5. Insurgent sympathizers
6. Underground members
7. Guerrilla forces

Then, noting that the security forces and the guerrilla forces are readily identifiable, he concludes that the "population which must be won" is comprised of the five center groups.¹⁹ When he is assessing the

¹⁸L.S.B. Leakey, Defeating the Mau Mau, quoted in Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 179.

¹⁹William A. Lybrand, Support, People, Control, Influence (n.p.d.), p. 56.

strength of the insurgent cause in an area, the counterinsurgent commander must also take into account the same population groupings. In his case he must determine each group's affinity for the cause in order to determine the best means to attack the cause and win the ideological support of the population. Both the number and the quality of the members of each group are indicators of the difficulty of his task. And since he is probably the first representative of the government vested with public authority to enter some areas, the success of the national counterinsurgency effort in those areas will depend heavily on the effectiveness of his handling of each of the groups and the people who comprise them. For it is only when the counterinsurgents demonstrate by attitude and action their desire and ability to eliminate grievances as well as to protect the people from the insurgents, that the people will transfer their loyalty.²⁰

Having established military control in an area by achieving a superiority over the guerrilla force, the counterinsurgent commander must now take action to consolidate his position and remove the causes for insurgency. Governing his actions by his assessment of the strength of the cause in terms of existing political, social, and psychological conditions, the degree and form of insurgent leadership, and the commitment of the population, he must set about the accomplishment of three tasks. They are:

1. To continue the separation of the people and the insurgents.
2. To establish effective leadership and administration.
3. To guarantee protection to the leaders and to the people.

²⁰Franklin M. Osanka, "Population Control Techniques of Communist Insurgents," Australian Army Journal, 176 (Jan 64), p. 18.

From the accomplishment of these tasks will come the winning of the support of the people, which is the only guarantee that the insurgency will not flare up anew from within.

The chapter on the defeat of the guerrilla dealt with the importance of achieving a physical separation of the guerrilla from the population. It emphasized at the same time that strong military force and the rigorous use of physical population control measures ranging in severity from curfews and roadblocks to the sealed village method of the Briggs Plan in Malaya²¹ or the Strategic Hamlets Program in South Vietnam²² could accomplish a physical separation of the population and the main guerrilla force. It also conjectured that the population would not be fully separated from the guerrilla until it had been ideologically separated from the insurgency.

The desired end of ideological separation of the people from the insurgency is removal of personal motivation to support the movement, or the awakening in the population of a desire not to support the insurgent group. Stated another way, it is the withdrawal of popular support from the insurgency and the enlistment of it in aid of the established order. Franklin M. Osanka, writing in the Australian Army Journal, lists four principal conditions of population control which result in support for communist insurgent groups: in-group loyalty, insurgent terror tactics, personal commitment, and government terror tactics.²³ To put these

²¹Letter from Colonel J.G. Cornett, U.S. Army Liaison Group, Singapore, Malaya, to Major William J. Beck, 18 Jul 61.

²²Viet-Nam, Republic of, "From Strategic Hamlet to Self-Defense Village."

²³Osanka, op. cit., p. 17.

conditions into a counterinsurgency framework requires only a slight modification of terms.

The idea of in-group loyalty does not change but its goals change. It is a loyalty condition which results from the acceptance by the majority of the population that the activities of the government are just and that the activities of the insurgent movement are unjust. In order for this idea to be credible to the members of the population, the counterinsurgent commander must ensure that his activities and those of his subordinates are consistent with the alleviating of discontent of the population and aligning with the desires of the majority group. The building of this in-group loyalty requires thoughtfulness and careful planning and discipline at all levels of command. The commander who allows his troops to confiscate their needs in an area already discontented by government corruption or suppression has destroyed the credibility of an honesty program. If the source of discontent has been one of remoteness, or dislocation, the commander who orders napalm, or rockets, or artillery concentrations against villages which could have been seized by a force no larger than an unsupported rifle company is going to have difficulty trying to convince the people of that area that their government really cares about them. His task will be doubled, at least, if it turns out that the village had not harbored a guerrilla force, or that the guerrilla force had departed after firing only a few shots. For the sake of the future effectiveness of his force, the military commander would be far better off to develop a detailed logistical plan and to risk a few riflemen casualties rather than to make enemies of the people whose support he seeks.

Rather than the terror tactics of the insurgent, the counterinsurgent commander should institute a system of rewards and punishments

to enforce the in-group loyalty. At the same time by virtue of control measures he should be able to set up opportunities for actions to occur which will illustrate their relative desirability. For example, in an area where political discontent formed the basis for insurgency, the willingness of a capable man to discharge responsibility honestly and faithfully, and in keeping with the desires of his own people, should be rewarded. On the other hand, the man who unlawfully butchers a pig in order to supply the remnants of the local guerrillas should be punished according to law. To add to the effect of this punishment, it should be administered by all the people if possible. A secret ballot to be made out by the entire populace and publicly counted might achieve this effect. As a side effect, the ballot might also serve the commander as an indicator of how well his program might be moving.

Personal commitment is probably the most effective method of control. The last two examples of actions which result in reward and punishment have illustrated conditions in which people either individually, as in the case of the honest administrator, or collectively, as in the punishment ballot, would take an action which would further the counterinsurgent cause. Even if the pig butcher had been voted a "slap on the wrist," the voters would still have participated in their own government. Of course the counterinsurgent commander should go further. He should establish or recommend a program of activities consistent with the positive national program which would involve as many of the people as possible. For each commitment is a brick in the wall between the individual and the insurgency.

The fourth principal condition of control depends on the insurgent movement's reaction to the government's success. If the insurgent leader finds himself losing control, he might attempt to regain his position by

terror tactics. Should he do that, the counterinsurgent commander must concentrate all his energies into protecting the people and at the same time labeling the guerrilla as a bandit, a wanton animal, and expose him as the frustrated barbarian he has become. The use of the terms "bandit" and "Communist Terrorist (CT)" rather than "guerrilla" or "insurgent" had a telling effect on the population in Malaya.²⁴ The Greeks called their war against the communist guerrillas "the anti-bandit war."²⁵

The task of separating the people from the support of the insurgency is therefore twofold. The separation must be both physical and ideological before it can be considered complete. The physical separation is achieved by the defeat of the guerrilla force and the establishment of physical controls over the population to insure that no physical contact between the two groups remains. Ideological separation depends on the establishment of three conditions and the exploiting of any advantage offered by a fourth. The counterinsurgent must build an in-group loyalty for his programs by gearing them to the needs and desires of the people; he must insure the efficacy of his programs by a fair system of rewards and punishments; and he must strive to get as much personal commitment for his programs as each individual can be prevailed upon to give. And finally he must be prepared at all times to give public censure for any and all obstructionist tactics the insurgents might employ against his programs. Once the population is separated from the insurgent movement and is ready to embrace the cause of

²⁴Paul M.A. Linebarger, "They call 'Em Bandits in Malaya," Combat Forces Journal (Jan 51), p. 56.

²⁵J.C. Murray, The Anti-Bandit War (Fort Bragg, N.C: U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 24 Sep 62).

established order, the foundation for preventing a recurrence of the insurgency will be firm.

Concurrently with the physical and ideological separation of the people from the insurgent movement, the counterinsurgent commander is faced with two other problems integral to removing the cause of insurgency. He must establish effective leadership in the objective area, and he must provide protection for the population. Although all of these actions must be conducted in the same time frame, they will be discussed separately in this portion of the paper.

With the departure of the guerrilla force or the withdrawal to the underground of the hard-core insurgents, the people find themselves at a loss for leadership and for a means to voice their discontents. As the first representative of the national government, the military commander must take immediate action to fill the void. As has been written earlier, insurgency is the reaction obtained from mixing dissatisfaction with rebellious leadership. Counterinsurgency, then, like a counteraction, must at least neutralize insurgency, or better, precipitate it out of solution. The following paragraphs will deal with the principal ingredient of the counteraction, leadership for counterinsurgency.

It is the function of leadership to hear problems and provide solutions. While the insurgent held sway, he heard and encouraged discontent and promised a solution based on violence. From his assessment of the strength of the cause, the counterinsurgent should be familiar with the problems and discontents, and he should be prepared with the means to solve them. But mere solution by the military commander first to arrive on the scene does not leave a situation disposed to prevent the recurrence of insurgency. Although the military commander must establish initial order to replace the deposed insurgent leadership or

to compete with the nocturnal leadership of a small underground, he must also establish an administrative system which will provide continuity for the civil administrators who will replace his initial military order. Of course, if capable civil administrative leadership already exists in an area, the military commander will not establish order but will assist the civil representatives of the national government by preserving order and recommending courses of action consistent with the capabilities of his force and the policies of the national authority. However, it is fallacious to assume in either case that those in authority initially would remain indefinitely. Therefore it will be in the best interests of all to establish a leadership system which will guarantee a degree of continuity. The solution, therefore, lies in establishing a degree of leadership based on the one group whose continued existence in the area is reasonably sure - the local population.

There are two methods by which such leadership can be established: selection by those who represent national authority; local election. Of the two, local election seems better. Selection might guarantee a higher technical proficiency or a greater initial political loyalty, but it smacks of puppet government and leaves open the possibility of a latent discontent based on real or imagined corruption. Local election at least allows the people a degree of choice in how their lives are to be administered; and it carries with it the bonus of gaining an additional commitment on the part of all those who participate in the election. In addition, any attempt on the part of the insurgents to disrupt the elective process can be turned against them with great effect. The recent election and peaceful turn-over of the Venezuelan government handed

communist insurgency in Latin America one of its biggest setbacks.²⁶

But an election does not just come about. To have an election there must be an issue; and in this case it must be local; and it must be manageable. The military commander should have within his means the makings of a manageable issue. By means of a survey conducted by his civil affairs, engineer, medical, and intelligence personnel, the commander should be able to amass a group of necessary projects within the capability of his means which could add in some way to the improvement of existing conditions in the area of operations. A schoolhouse, a small dispensary, an improved road to the market center, a public well, or improved irrigation ditches, even labor assistance at harvest time; all these should be within the capability of the counterinsurgency commander or the means should be made available to him. The priorities for the execution of these projects can provide sufficient issue for an election. All the commander must do is ask the assembled people to select from among their own number a committee which will establish the priorities of work. The people will provide the basis for continuing local leadership. Once that has been established, the representatives of the national government become the link between the local leadership and the central authority. As long as that link rings true, the military commander's task of preventing the recurrence of insurgency will be greatly simplified.

The third task of the military commander engaged in removing the cause of insurgency is to provide protection for the leaders and for the people of an area of operations. Protection can be divided into

²⁶D.B. Richardson, "Where U.S. Won and Castro Lost in Latin America," U.S. News and World Report, 55 (16 Dec 63), pp. 92-94.

two elements: external and internal protection. The external protection is that which is intended to secure the perimeter of a cleared area from intrusion by guerrilla forces attempting to attack or to infiltrate into the area. The type of activity employed in this portion of the defense is characterized by the establishment of road blocks and check points during critical hours, by continuous contact patrolling from patrol bases which move at irregular intervals and by the maintenance of a reserve equipped with the highest degree of mobility available in the command.

Regardless of how skilled or capable the external forces might be, however, there is always the chance that a guerrilla force could infiltrate an area, or that guerrilla organizers might infiltrate the area to summon known part-time guerrillas to duty. It is the function of the internal protection force to guard against or minimize the effect of these incursions.

In areas where the intensity of insurgency had been high, and where the insurgent threat remains high despite the internal defense systems, it might be necessary to require the population to live within an enclosure. Such an action should not be taken as a matter of course; it should be taken only when the enclosure is required to provide protection for the members of the population. In South Viet-Nam the strategic hamlet concept is a manifestation of this thinking. That the Viet-Nameese government has been able to realize the bonus effects of population control and political unit development is gratifying; but as in the Old West, unless there is a danger from the Indians, there is no reason to herd people into the stockade. If population enclosure is necessary, every effort should be made to enclose existing living areas rather than relocate people to fit a defensive pattern. In addition, military guards

in population enclosures should be replaced by militia guards recruited from the group living in the enclosure as soon as possible.²⁷

The protection of the population from the insurgent, then, is a combination of external and internal defensive systems. Coupled with security checks and other police intelligence systems the protective system should reduce insurgent-population contacts almost to nil and allow the counterinsurgent program to consolidate its position and prepare to prevent a recurrence of insurgency.

²⁷ Roger Hilsman, A Report on South Viet Nam (From the Daily Bulletin of the United States Information Agency, Saigon, Viet-Nam, 24 Sep 62), pp. 7-10.

CHAPTER VI

PREVENTING INSURGENT RETURN

With the guerrilla force cleared from the area of operations and a high degree of protection established, and with the political administration of the area in the hands of civil ministers, the military commander must now turn his attention to the prevention of the recurrence of the insurgency. Naturally the planning for this task had been accomplished earlier; but for the sake of writing convenience, both the planning and execution of this task will be discussed here as a single entity. Also, to ignore the political action necessary to the prevention of a recurrence of insurgency would be fallacious. However, it is reasonable to assume that except in extraordinary circumstances it will be conducted by civil administrators acting in consonance with a national counterinsurgency program.

There are two principles involved in the military action to prevent the recurrence of insurgency in an area: the principle of economy of force, and the principle of personal commitment by at least a portion of the population.

There is no nation with a regular security force of military forces and police that it can rely totally on its regular establishment to guard its entire area sufficiently to prevent insurgency and still fulfil all the other commitments of a national defense force. The war against the FLN insurgency in Algiers caused the French to employ there 500,000 troops which were also committed to employment under NATO. Also, the use of

well trained regular forces which are capable of conducting offensive operations against organized guerrilla forces as protection forces in secured areas represents a great waste of the combat power available to the counterinsurgent commander.¹ It becomes clear, therefore, that some means must be found to relieve the trained military forces from area or border guarding duties in cleared areas in order that they might be employed offensively against guerrilla forces elsewhere in the nation. Of course, as long as a strong guerrilla force threatens an area, there is full justification for maintaining a strong military force to contain or defeat it. However, once the counterinsurgency program has proceeded beyond the stage of mopping up the last organized guerrilla force in an area and the occupation and destruction of all guerrilla bases in the area, except for a force to protect the population against an external insurgent threat, there is small justification for maintaining a strong military force in an area.

There is, however, a continuing requirement of protecting the leaders and population of the area from violence which might occur should the insurgent forces attempt to recoup their loss in the area. As a result, there now exists a need for persons with a degree of military training who are capable of relieving regular military forces of the security of fixed installations and internal patrols, initially, and later, as training and the situation permit, to relieve them of the external and reserve security measures for the area. These are paramilitary forces. The final task of the military commander in a counterinsurgency operation area is the organizing, arming, and training of these forces.

¹Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla War and Modern Strategy," Orbis, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1958), p. 77.

The recruits for these forces should come from the area itself, Urged by a strong sense of personal commitment to protecting their home area from insurgency, familiar with the terrain and the population, these forces should make up in motivation and local knowledge what they might lack in military skills. In South Viet-Nam such forces, the Bao-An (Civil Guard) and Dan-Ve (Self-defense Corps), have acquitted themselves creditably against the Viet-Cong guerrilla.²

The training of these forces should be phased according to recruitment rates and security requirements in the area of operations. The training should be conducted by teams selected from the regular units in the area and on the same terrain that the paramilitary unit will be expected to use. The training should be phased from the center out; and regular troops replaced by trained paramilitary forces should begin training for, or be move to, commitment in a new area of operations. The first paramilitary forces to be trained should be those responsible for security of fixed installations in the internal protection system. Since fixed installations require greater concentration during certain hours, the paramilitary guards for these installations can be part-time security forces.

The next forces to be trained should be the remainder of the internal security forces. Since their duties require the conduct of security checks and searches at all hours, these forces must be on a full-time duty status. Ideally, these forces will eventually make up the police for the area; therefore, they should be trained as police as well as security forces for internal areas.

²Jerry Rose, "The Peasant Is the Key to Vietnam," Anthology of Related Topics on Counterinsurgency (Lackland Military Training Center, Lackland Air Force Base, 1 Mar 63), p. 91.

Finally, paramilitary forces can be trained to replace the external protection forces. After these paramilitary forces have been given training as squads, they should be assigned, by platoons, to companies already engaged in the external security mission on the border of the area of operations. While there, the paramilitary forces will receive training in patrolling, ambushing, and advanced tactics until they can be formed as companies and later, possibly, battalions to replace the external security forces of the regular establishment. Concurrent with the training of the perimeter forces, the reserve element of the external security force trains a similar paramilitary force to take its place. Once the senior commander responsible for the military portion of the national internal security program is satisfied with the training and readiness of the paramilitary organization of an operational area, the responsibility for that area passes to its home guard organization. The security of the area from insurgency is now the responsibility of those on whom it had depended all along - the people.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMING UP

The introduction to this paper proposed that a doctrine can be approached on four levels: philosophical, conceptual, structural, and applicatory. A doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign is no different from any other with respect to the four doctrinal approaches. This paper has employed the philosophical approach to the formulation of such a doctrine by establishing a definition for counterinsurgency in terms of insurgency. Then, using as a basis the analysis of the counterinsurgent commander's mission, it developed a series of theoretical actions the commander might take on a philosophical level, made them the basis for doctrine.

This paper has attempted to make clear the political nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency as it affects a doctrine for military operations. While it is true that such a doctrine, especially at the philosophical level, makes many allusions to the necessity for political as well as military actions, nowhere is there a requirement for a military commander to indulge in the field of partisan politics. But there is a decided advantage accruing to the military commander who understands the theory and philosophy of human politics and who allows that understanding to assist him in shaping the decisions he must make. And I have pointed out that no military doctrine can help a regime which is morally bankrupt in the field of human politics.

In the discussion of the nature of insurgency this paper emphasized

that insurgency should be recognized by its goal and not by its tactics. Although guerrilla warfare has characterized most insurgent activity during the past two decades, there is no guarantee that an insurgency which starts tomorrow morning will have a guerrilla force as its fighting arm. The goal of insurgency is the overthrow of established authority and its replacement by a regime favored by the insurgent movement. The definition of insurgency in this paper assumes five levels of activity, and the goal of each of these is the same, the overthrow of established authority. While the appearance of a guerrilla force is a good indicator that an insurgency exists, it is important to remember that the guerrilla force is only the tactical manifestation of the insurgency. The defeat of an insurgent guerrilla force, therefore, is only a means to the end of a counterinsurgency campaign. The counterinsurgent commander must be aware of all five levels of insurgency, and he must be sure that his decisions take into account the defeat or the prevention of all of them. The counterinsurgency commander who fixes his gaze only on the guerrilla might find himself vulnerable to a conventional attack or cut off from his political base by a clandestine insurgent organization which has terrorized itself to power while the government military force has spent itself chasing guerrillas. The counterinsurgent commander must be prepared to meet all levels of insurgent activity.

However, because, the military forces of the United States have a large body of doctrine for the conduct of wars against conventional forces, and because operations in a full-scale war of movement would require only slight modification of that doctrine, this paper limits itself to the formulation of a doctrine to meet the contingency posed by an insurgency characterized by the employment of a guerrilla force. In this case the commander can analyze his mission in terms of three tasks:

the defeat of the insurgent force, the guerrilla; the removal of the cause for insurgency; and the prevention of its recurrence.

The means to accomplishing the defeat of the guerrilla - denying him support of the people, a secure base, and military initiative - share with the removal of the insurgent cause and the prevention of further insurgency the idea of achieving a degree of separation between the people and the insurgent movement. The defeat of the guerrilla brings, in fact depends on, the physical separation of the two. The removal of the insurgent cause by satisfying the discontent of the people, replacing the leadership and infrastructure of the insurgency, and guaranteeing the people protection against insurgent directed reprisal or extortion achieves an ideological separation. Finally, the action to prevent the recurrence of insurgent intrusion into an area already restored to an attentive and responsive authority, by means of training and equipping the people to fight to defend what they have, can be called prophylactic separation of the population from the insurgent movement. Here, in summary, is the philosophical approach to formulating a doctrine for senior commanders engaged in military operations in a counterinsurgency campaign.

This paper has not so much answered the Viet-Nameese battalion executive officer's question as much as it has established doctrinal conditions to make unnecessary its being asked again.¹ The use of a forcing game strategy might find him few guerrillas to fight at first, but as it becomes more and more obvious that once the insurgent abandons an area he will not get it back, he might try to make a fight of it. The rest of the forcing game, the gradual converting and protecting

¹Cf. FOREWORD

of areas might be considered as an instrument known to be superior to a finger when it comes to eating soup - a spoon.

For the dead man we can do no more. But for his brothers, we can show that the arrival or appearance of government troops in an area is a harbinger of insurgent departure and assumption of government control and administration on a permanent basis. Protected by a regime attentive and responsive to their needs and desires, the people can stand and welcome the forces of order rather than run at the command of those who might terrorize them.

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